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INTRODUCTION 
"What is self? 11 Man has been occupied with 
this subject more than with any other question. It is 
one of the most common questions ani a central part of 
human interest. The relation of the self to the Absolute 
h e,s b P.en one of the most difficult problems in the field 
of me.n' s thinking, philosophical and religious, as some-
one has said, "One may understand the cosmos, but never 
the Ee;o; the Self is more distant than any star". Since 
Socrates first said 11Know thyself", the philosophers, 
theologians and psychologists have been t~ring to tell 
us what manner of creature t h is self is. Soul, person, 
mini, consciousness, behavior, all have been used to 
denote the self. Takirg the problem as their special 
provi:me the modern psychologists have dropped soul and 
mind from their vocabulary, and are now divi ded into 
two general camps, rallying around two opposing con-
ceptions, self as consciousness, or experience, and self 
as · behavior, as biolog ical adjustment or reaction. Then 
there are to be found all grades bet·ween these two extremes, 
and those who would bring about either a happy medium or 
a synthesis of the two vi ew s. As they are divided over 
the conception of their sub ject ma tter, so are they divided 
regarding the me thods of approach to their problems. So 
we hear much of Structuralists, and Functionalists, 
Behaviorists c-.nd Self-Psycholog ists. We read tha t psych-
• 
• 
ology is the "de script ion and exp la.nation of the states 
1 
o f cons c iou sne s s as such 11 • 11 Psyc holog y is the scie ne e 
o :f self and the facts of self as manifested in indivi-
dual e xperience •• " 2 "Psychology is a study of me ntal 
pro cesses". 3 "Psycholog y is the science of the self 
in relation to, or c onscious of, its environment. n4 
"Psycholog y i s that div lsi on o f na. tural sc i e nce wh i ch 
take s human activity a ni co nduct for i ts subje ct matter." 5 
The obj e ct of this paper is no t to make a 
critical analysis of any of these differi ng co ncepti ons, 
but to attemp t a brie f expo s ition of s ome of the out-
stand ine; theories of c onsciousness, or self, show their 
origin i n the history of psychology , and raise the question 
of t he 1r i mplications for our relig ious th i nking . 
1. J ames, Psycholog; y.t__Bri e fer Course, p. 1 
2. McDo ugall , r_sy cg _._Rev., 19 (191 2), 387 
3. J udd, Psych olog y, p . 1. 
4. Cali{ ins, A Fi.r_st ~ook~Ps_:.~cholo p;y , p . 1. 
5. Wats :)n,Psychology from the Standp oint of a Beh avi orist, 
p . 
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I. Brief Historical Development o~ 
Various Theories of the Soul • 
A. Ancient Theories 
1. Primitive theories. 
One of the first thin gg about which primitive 
man began to speculate and wonder was the soul. Life 
begins and life ends. What happens when the person, 
active ~~d strong yesterday, today is cold and still and 
unrespon sive? Death was one of the first things primi-
t ive man had to face, and naturally among the first 
questions that came to his mind was, what is this prin-
cipl~ or part of man, this invisible part that is here 
and then is gone? He noticed the brea th as seen and 
felt, and that this breath ;;yas not present af t er the 
individual died, and so early came to the con clusion 
that the air and the soul were at least akin, if not 
identical. 
Primitive man was intere sted in the questions 
pertaining to his existence and bothered his mind but 
little in working out a system of knowledge, nor was he 
conscious of any n eed of agreement between the parts of 
his knowledge. The origins of psychology are hard to 
discover among the confusion of tradition, myth and 
beginnings of philosophical thought. The idea that one 
• 
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might indulge in thought for the sake of thought, or 
that knowledge might be sought purely for the sake of 
knowledge, is a late development in the history of 
man. 
His first object of interest was the person 
to primitive man, the body - for it was the body that 
came first under his notice in the field of action. 
The first interest to be aroused was thus anthropo-
logical. The early speculative theories were dominated 
by categories developed from the physical world, and by 
ana:hogy, transferred to the spiritual world, making 
the soul . a physical entity. Elementary knowledge was 
gained from int erest in man's o; n feeling s and reactions, 
or from his own experience. For instance, it was only 
through experience or feeling that man arrived at the 
idea that courage was centered in the heart. But the 
i dea of life after death could not be grasped by exper-
ience, and the transfer of physical qualities to spirit-
ual entities was his only solution. Life after death 
is not a f ;.mdamental problem of psy cholog;y, perhaps, 
but by the fact of death was the only way that primitive 
man concluded that the soul and body wer e distinc~ and 
separate • 
In the early theories of the soul the main 
points are very similar. The beginning and end of life 
•• 
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were more serious than the phenomena of conscious ex-
perience. The early Greek, Hindu, Egyptian and Persian 
ideas regarding the soul were not widely different in 
in their fundamental aspects. 
2. Early Greek theories. 
If we go back as far as Homer, we find the 
simple recognition of change, that as an object of 
sense, the person after death, remains, but as the 
subject of action, initiative or response, he is gone. 
This soul, or central principle of action, 
was to the Greeks, as to other primitive peoples, a 
wraith or shadow of a person, a sort of second body, 
a breath-like substance that animated the body and 
left it at death. 
The interest in psychology arose from the 
interest in man and his ideas about feeling , and the 
relation of this "feeling" or inner shadow to the 
body. A second interest arose in the social life, or 
the relation of one individual to another, and with 
these, the interest in the life of the soul after 
1 death. Brett tells us tbat to the Greek of the sixth 
century B. C., the human being was a peculiar modi-
fication of universal principles. He was primarily 
matter, but exhibited motion, initiated from within. 
1. Brett, History of Psychology, Pg. 18. 
• 
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He was co nscious tha t he shared with tbB rest o f the 
animal world in the sheer enjoyment of being "alive 11 • 
The I onians held in addition, that man was the u ni-
verse in miniature; man the r.J.icrocosm, the ·world the 
macr o so sm. Thus we see that early attempts at thought 
were all along the lines of physical philosophy rather than 
ps y chology. Thale s, considered the f ounder of Greek 
philosophy , g ives us nothing at all that could be 
termed p sychological. The p sychological idea.s that 
were developed appear as activities of the soul. 
Dual is tic theories early arose due to the influence 
of pre- scien ti fie ideas. All the early thinkers were 
h y lozoists. 
Alcr1aeon (earl v 6th cent.) was the f irst to 
state that the brain was the center of co n scious life, 
the meet i~~ place of the senses. 
Heraclitus (1+70 B. C. ) made the first attempt 
to account f or ment a l phenomena. With fire as his 
ultimate, all th ings must be reduced i n some way to a 
place i n the fire (or heat ) cycle, and the s~ul a nd 
the body were two separate stages in the cycle. His 
p sych ology seems t o be mostly a collection of generali-
zations, and it is difficult to gather any specific 
theorie s. 
Anaxagoras posited a "nous" thB .t permeate d 
the universe. This nous was the motivat i ng p ovrer, the 
• 
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principle of order, or Intelligence of the universe. 
We see here the first beginnine;s of a spiritualistic 
interpretation. -The superiority of one individual 
over another depended upon the proportion of the 
nous within him. 
Among the most important of the men of 
this age is Democritus (460-357 B.C.). He was the first 
thoroughgoing materialist and explained all phenomena 
from a strictly mechanical point of view. For him just 
two things were necessary for any expla.nation, atoms 
and motion. The soul was composed of these s.toms. 
Difference in character was due to a difference in 
the quantitative relation of the atoms. Difference 
'between the body and the soul was also just a difference 
in atoms. The soul atoms vvere gathered together and 
located like a body within a body in the brain. 
Life depended upon the unrestricted supply of "soul 
atoms". 
This view was carried to the extreme by 
Epicurus (341-270) who said that these soul atoms 
were round and smooth and composed of fire, vapor and 
an unknown element. Tertullian (160-222) took up this 
theory, and combind.ng it with Aristotle's "pneuma", 
called his conception of the soul the "breath of God", 
• 
• 
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describing it as a bright, vapory substance, emanating 
from the paternal seed at birth. It was visible and 
immortal. This view was taught by many of the early . 
Church Fathers. 
A quite different contribution to the beginn-
ings of psychology was made by Protagoras (480-411 B.C, • 
He taught that all experience was primarily an impres s ion+ 
He went to great length to show that experience and 
knowledge are i dentical, and therefore subject to the 
same limitations. He gives us our first empirical psy-
chology. 
We find little in the teachings of Socrates 
which we can term as purely psychological. However,we 
do find some general conceptions that .would do credit 
to many modern thinkers. For Socrrates, the individual 
maans the person. He looked upon man as a whole. Self-
development, self-consistency, self-knowled€5.e - these 
were his key-notes. His great aim was to teach the in-
dividual concerning himself and his relation to other 
individuals. Throughout all his teaching we find him 
emphasizing the unity of man. He was primarily intro-
spective in his methods. He recognized an element in 
the self which he called the 11daemon"- ane1errent which 
he could not analyze, but which he called his divine 
• 
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voice or sign, and 1mich he trusted implicitly. He 
regarded it as an undercurrent of individual life, 
but which was also the unifying element of all 
existence, universal and divine, not far different 
from Plato's "Good". One might almost think of Socrates 
as laying the foundation for a personalistic philosophy 
or a self-psychology. 
Plato is really the first to .attempt a 
systematic theory. Plato, in the light of his ethical 
theories, was forced to rebel against the sensationalism 
that had come to be the accepted doctrine of the day. 
Psychological dualism reached its highest point at the 
hands of Plato. The soul holds an intermediate position 
between idea and matter. It knows ideas but is bound 
to the body. So it is part of the time an object of 
· sci entific knowledge and part of the time of metaphysical 
thought. Looking at it from one standpoint, the soul is 
mechanical, and fro m another, it is purposive, rational 
and non-mechanical. His division of the soul into reason, 
will and desire is familiar to all. It has spacial sep-
aration and is located i n the head, breas t and lower 
body. This is analogous to his conception of the social 
order, which is divided into the artisan , warrior and 
1 
philosopher classes. 
1. In the "Timius ?t we find an elaborate description 
of these the or i es. 
• 
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His theories of memory, sensation and 
association were the foundation for prevailing theories 
for many years. Sensation implies the immediate re-
lation to an external object. Mind is capable, though, 
of dealing with objects not externally present, and 
this power is memory, or the preservation of sensation. 
By association he meant what we popularly mean by 
association today. The two factors in his conception 
of associ a.tion were likeness and unlikeness, and we 
must look to Aristotle far a more complete expbsition 
of this subject. In spite of his many divis i ons of 
the soul, he constantly emphasized the un i te of can-
sciousne ss, and the close relationship between sensation, 
memory, desire and judgment. The great problem that he 
could not overcome was the dualism that he set up. 
But the soul knows both itself and the body. I ~,s true 
goal i s t }:}e pur su i t of oro.er , t he order t hat arose ou t 
of chaos and reaches perfecti on i n the complete develop-
ment of a self-dependent soul, attune 1vi th the Soul Ol' 
Order of the universe, God. How modern this ancient 
thinker~ 
Coming to Aristotle we find the foundations 
for a definite theory of empiricism. J...ristotle also 
holds to a dualism of soul and body, the body being 
matter and the soul form. The problem of psychology 
is the relation of the t wo. Hence he approaches his 
• 
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psychology from the side of metaphysics. He ma~es 
three divis i ons, body, soul ani spirit, a conce ption 
he l d into mod ern times. He finds the unity between 
body and soul in this third division, the 11pneuma" , a 
mediating substance or entity between the physical and 
the psychical. The pneuma transmits the sensations 
receiv ed from the external world through the blood to 
the centre of the heart. 
The soul is to the body what form 1s to matter. 
It is the first complete or perfect form. It is the 
active, formative principle, the "entelecpy"of the 
body. In this way he tries to do away with the dualism 
he started with, and takes a very modern position that 
the psycho-physical organism 1s the subject matter of 
psychology. The soul manifests itself in three grades 
of faculties, nutrition, sense perception and reason. 
The first of these is found i n plants , the second in 
animals and the third i n man. But since the higher 
always includes the lower, there is unity throughout. 
The five senses were outlined as we think of them to-
day, but he postul8.ted an additional or central sense, 
located in the heart, which differentiated between the 
senses. He built a definite system of "faculty" psych-
ology, grading the faculties and their centres in accord 
with their ranlc of importance, be ginning w1 th taste and 
• 
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endin13 with sight. 
The body exists only for the soul, for the 
soul is reality, but can be reality only so long as 
it is motivating something. Soul and body cannot be 
defined one without the other. The soul is the "func-
tional reality", the potentiality of activity. He 
do e s not divide the soul into parts as does Plato, but 
into modes or phases. As with Plato, motion was a 
serious psychological problem. It requires three 
factors, that vmich moves, t hat which is moved, and an 
unmoved mover. This last is reason, which is both 
active and passive, and is the final goal of the uni-
verse. The basis for this motion is furnished by the 
Good. He seems to be attempting an explanation of 
those processes which end in conscious action. Where 
Plato foUnd the highest form of motion in the soul, 
Aristotle says the soul is unmoved, the final cause 
of motion. This is reason, the source of all knowledge, 
free and universal. 
In Aristotle, then, we find the basis for 
empiricism, especially "faculty" psychology, and bio-
logical evaluation coming for the first time into 
prominence. 
We may do well to close our discussion of 
these early Greek theories by quoting Windleband. He 
• 
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says that the limitation of ancient psychologies, 
especially the Greek, is that they recognized no 
creative activity of con sci ousne ss. "This is a 
general limit for all Greek psychology; the content 
for ideas must so mehow be given to the soul; hence, 
if the ideas are n ot given in perception, and the 
soul nevertheless finds the~ in herself on occasion 
of perception, she must already have received these 
1 
ideas in some other way." 
Professor Knudson says, "Reason is the 
passive recipient of ideas which come to it from 
without and in this s~nse even the Greek Rationalism 
may be s poken of as empiricistic."2 
3. Indian Conceptions of the Soul. 
There i s a great deal of difficulty in de-
termining the ideas of the earlier Indian thinkers, 
because of the oral method of transmission. However, 
by the seventh century B.C. we find six prominent 
systems of philosophy . While this coincides rather 
nearly to the period of development of Greek thought, 
1. History of Philosophy, p. 119 
2. Present Tendencies in Religious Thought, p. 96 
• 
• 
- 12 -
it is not thought that one influenced the other until 
after the conquest of Alexander. It is strange, then, 
that we find so many similarities in these early theories 
of the soul. Of the six main systems of Indian thought, 
Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaye., Vaisishika, Mima.D'Ib., and Vedanta, 
only three, the Sankhya, Nyaya, and Vaisishika, furnish 
any really psychological material. Throughout these 
there is a strong emphasis on the subjective. 
The most influential of the systems iS the 
Vedanta, which gives considerable attention to the study 
of consciousness. The central thought is that the 
highest state of consciousness is realised only when 
the normal consciousness (the consciousness of our 
ordinary waking hours) is transcended. In sleep con-
sciousness, or self, is set free from the ordinary 
limits of existence, and sleep is a hi gher state of con-
sciousness than waking. In a deep and~ .~-mless sleep, 
the soul is still more free, an¢1. may wander or rest 
without physical hinderances. Of course, t h e highest 
state of all is "eternal consciousness", when all 
physical bonds are removed, and is ab0ve all other things 
to be desired • 
Unlike the Greek ideas, the soul is not in 
the body, but the body is a fact of conscioune ss. Con-
sciousness is reality, and therefore can be described 
• 
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only in terms of its mvn existence. Thoughts are 
ultimate. Thoughts are thoughts of things. The 
thought of the body then, is real, and the body is 
,!g the soul or consciousness. The waking conscious-
ness is absorbed in thoughts of the objective world, 
and that is why deep sleep is a higher state of con-
sciousness than waking hour s . Because of ·this con-
ception we find Indian theories greatly complicated 
with theories of the subconscious. Thought moves in 
. 
two directions, inward toward - itself and outward toward 
the external world. When it moves outward , it moves 
to things of the external world, and a great plurality, 
and hence confusion, is the result. This plurality is 
a great burden, but there is a way of escape, and this 
is the way of contem~lation, far by this road one may 
turn thought inward toward the self and find unity in 
the Absolute, and by contemplation the soul may even 
merge into the Absolute, and then thought becomes un-
limited, and is reality. 
The great distinction here to be made is be-
tween the Atman and the Brahman, or between the indiv id-
ual and the cosmic thought. The self becomes a thinking 
substance. It may be treated i n two ways, as a complex 
of selves, or according to the degree of r eality reached 
through c ontemplation. From the first point of view :there 
• 
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are five selves: the outer body, a fact existing in 
consciousness; the natural v.~t a::L force; .· the active 
spirit, wh lch compares more . to Aristotle's "entelechy"; 
the principle of knowled§9; and the transcendent self, 
upon which is dependent "eternal bliss". From the 
standpoint of reality there are three degrees to be 
experienced: the reflection of the body, the self of 
the ignorant; co nsci ousness as every day experience, 
considered to be the self by the unthinking; the supreme 
self, the transcendent self reacbed by meditation. This 
last state i s the supreme goal of the self, or conscious 
life. 
The doctrine of transmigration is the great 
difficulty in Indian thought that necessarily colors all 
psychological theories. It is the great fear in the 
hearts of the people. The absorption of the individual 
soul into the cosmic soul, the Atman into the Bre~an, 
is the way devised for escape from the suffering of in-
numerable transmigrations. 
The Sankhya1B a little more scientific in it :::.1 
approach to psychology. The followers of this system 
recognize a dualism of spirit and matter, and though allied 
with matter, spirit is independent. Thus the self, in 
this system, is not a par±..,..of the cosmic self, but an 
independent reality. Neither is t~e any ultimate unity. 
• 
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All selves are included in the idea of the self, but 
not in the universal self, is the way Brett explains 
1 
this conception • 
The goal of the conscious life here also is 
the freedo~ from all contact with the physical world, 
but While the Vedanta seek s freedom even from knowledge, 
the Sankhya recognizes that knowledge is necessary to 
understar~ and eliminate the physical, pain and desire. 
The Vaisishlka is still more scientific in 
attitude, being decidedly atomistic. But like the others, 
escape is the key, and meditation the method. 
The Lokayata-a theo r y not included by the 
Hindus in the nsix systems" - is worthy of note because 
of its utter lack of idealism so prominent in the others. 
It is atomistic and holds the.t the body and the soul 
perish together. We find this theory practically 
parrallel to that of Democrltus, both in time of develop-
ment and in conception. 
4. Buddhistic theories. 
The Buddhistic conceptions of soul, like the 
Hindu, are influenced greatly by the doctrine of trans-
migration. They grew up from the Hindu philosophies 
and have their basis in them. Like the Sankhya idea, 
1. History_of Psycho!£gx p. 212 
• 
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there is not one self but several selves. Perhaps we 
could ~o no better than to quote from the Nikaya. 
"Better were it, bhikkus, that the uneducated 
folk should conceive this four-fold element 
made body, rather than chitta, to be soul. 
And why? · The body is seen to perish for a 
y~ar, for two, three, four, five, ten or 
twenty years, or even for longer, while that 
vm. ich is called consciousness, that is mind, that 
is intelligence, arises as one thing, ceases 
as another, both by night and by day."l 
-
"A nd consciousness is designated only in 
accordance with the conditions causing it: 
visual consciousness from the seeing eye and 
the seen ob~ct; euditory consciousness from 
the hearing and sound; ......•• thought from 
mind and mental object. Jus t as fire is 
different according to the kind of fUel ..• 
Do ye see, bhikkus, that this is (something 
that has) become? Do ye see that the becoming 
is according to the stimulus (literally food)? 
Do ye see that if the stimulus2ceases, that that v;h ich has be come ceases?" 
These two quotations give the center of 
Buddhist psychology. The four-fold element refers to 
the four aspects of conscliousness. These are mind, or 
intelligence, facts or experiences of . co nsc lou sness, 
matter, or the physical, and the ideal state of 
h appiness or bliss, reached, as in the Hindu thought, 
by co ntemplation. 
Consciousness is unlimited in extension. 
Again we find the three planes of life, or degrees of 
1. Samyutta-Nikaya, 11, 94, translated by Mrs. Davids, 
Buddhist PsycholoEI' p. 94. 
2. Majjhima-Nikaya, 1,256, Mrs. Davids, 
Buddhist Psychology, p 15-16 
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reality, t he last of vmich may transcend the other, 
and be absorbe d into a universe of just bei ng . Here 
ae;ain we find the idea of consciou sness not unlit:e 
Aristotle's motivating princ1pie, and we note a 
strange likeness b et ween the three planes of life and 
Aristotle's three grades of faculti es, nutrition, 
sense-perception and re a son. 
Consciousness is the immortal p art of man, 
and is the part that goes on from reincarnation to 
r eDurnat l on . The term Self-consc i ousne s s is used to 
denote the consciousness of one life s pan. "A bhikku-
without deceit or guile manifests the self as he really 
is ••• " This self is divided into five categorie s, 
rna terial qualitie s , feeling, sense-perce ption, complexes, 
and c on sciousness of the ot-her four, this last being the 
unif yi ng principle of the self. 
Feeling and sensation ar e described with a 
rather hedonistic co loring , expla ined ent ir ely according 
to p le asure and pain, holding tha t on e perceives only 
that which gives rise to a feeling of pl easure or pain. 
Here again we see a sort of evolutionary con-
ception of consciousness. "The things of this world and 
its inhabitants are s ubject to change; they are products 
of things that existed before; all living creatures are 
what their past made them; for the lpW of cause and effect 
f 
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is uniform and vnthout exceptions. But in the changing 
things truth lies hidden. Truth makes things real. 
Truth is the permanent in change. And truth desires 
to appear; truth longs to become conscious; Truth 
strives to know itself. Tp ere is truth in the stone, 
for the stone is here; and no power in the world, no 
God, no man, no demon, can destroy its existence. But 
the stone has no consciousness. There is truth in the 
plant and it s life can expand; the plant grows and 
blossoms and bears fntit. Its beau ty is marvelous, but 
it has no consciousness. There is truth in the animal; 
it moves about and perceives its surroundings; it dis-
tinguishes and l e arns to choose. There is consciousness, 
b ut it is not the consciousness of truth. It is the 
consciousness, of self only, the consciousness of self 
dims the eyes of the mind and hides the truth .•. ~ ul 
B. Scholastic interpreta tions. 
Scholasticism is divided into two great 
periods. The first period is dominated by Platonic 
Idealism, through the i nfluence of Augusti ne , and the 
second is decidedly Aristotelian. This second period 
is again divided between the nominalists and realists, 
1. Carus, Paul, The Gospel of Buddha, p. 5 
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both purr) orting to be interpreters of Aristotle. The 
chief interest throughout is theological and little 
psychology may be gleaned, and little of that is nevv, 
most of it being but reflections of Plato and Aristotle. 
While the theological views were many, in general the 
psychological are much in agreement. 
God created nature, human souls and angels. 
The latter are pure spirit. The soul is form inherent 
in matter. There are both plant souls and animal souls, 
but both exist only as they exist in matter. Therefore 
man is both spirit and matter, one substance. Th e soul 
is conceived of much as Aristotle described it, the vital~ 
motivating, intelligent principle of the body. The early 
Scholastics held to the theory of two souls; the sen si-
tive or natural soul, vmose function is sense-perception, 
imag ination, and desire and the intelligent or superior 
soul, the functions of vihich are memory , intellect and 
will. The inferior s oul is present in ~~e embryo, but 
the superior soul is cre a ted by God and presented at 
birth. Some taught that the soul instead of b e ing spec-
ially created was generated from the parents. Thomas 
Aquinas, however, held to the idea of one soul with 
different capacities. 
The intelligent soul, or the intelligent as-
pect of the soul, is the saul that is immortal and can 
f~nction independently of the body. Augustine laid 
• 
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much stress on the individuality of the soul. 
Scholasticism gathered the best thought of the 
day from France, England, Germany and Spain, and paved 
the way for modern sci en t1 fie methods . 
C. Rationalistic Systems. 
1. Descartes ar1d. the later Cartesians. 
The relation of mind and body was the central 
problem that occupied the attention of the next importa rn t 
group of contributors to the field of psycholo&, a.l!-d 
one to which Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz gave much 
attention. The problem was brought to the frmtt by 
Descartes and worked out by Malebranche a nd Geulincx 
in the theory known as Occasionalism. The dualism of 
mind and body, with their irrecon cilable attributes of 
thoug.'lt and extension was the starting point. Descartes, 
be ginning by doubting all, and then arri vine; by deduc tion 
at his famous "cognito, ergo sum", finally .builds a gain 
his e'1"'-ire system on the undeniableness of consciousness. 
The fc::undati on of his philosophy is the existence of the 
self. The first attribute of the self is thought, " I 
am, then, to sp eak with precision, a thing which thinks, 
ltl that is to say, a min:1 , an understandine;, or a reason- -
By the fact of the inn.ate idea of God, a nd by the law 
of cause and effect, he proves t o his satisfaction the 
existence of God. In regar d to matter he concludes · that 
1. Meditations II, quoted by Rog ers, 
Student's History of Philosoph~, p. 267 
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extension is the only certain quality. With self, God 
and extension, his problem is the relation of these. 
How can two such totally distinct and different 
things as mind and rna tter, or thoue;ht and extension, 
act and react on e on the otmr? How can we have a 
single world of two diametrically opposed attributes? 
The 11 life 11 {motion) of the body he thought was adequate-
ly explained mechanically, but admits that the mind 
may interfere at any time. The seat o f this inter-
action is in the p ineal gland. From here the soul may 
move the body thr au gh the "animal spirits 11 or fine 
partie les of blood. The mind by itself is capable of 
pure thought, but when influenced by the body gives 
rise to s uch modes of consciousness as sensations, 
emoti on s, etc. The d~sciples of Descartes were not 
entirely satisfied with this indefinite and unproved 
conception. They could not understaro how two such 
opposed thing s as mind and body could influence each 
other. They solved it by falling back on the omnipo-
tence of God. In gen eral the theory simply is that 
mind and matter do not act upon e a ch other directly, but 
upon occasion, when a change talces pla ce in one, God 
intervenes and bring s about a similar change in the 
other. Hence the name "Occas ionalism •. " 
• 
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2. Spinoza. 
Spinoza he.d a great task bequeathed to him • 
Descarte s and the Cartesianists had split the world 
int~ two irreconcilable substance s and a God distinct 
and aloof fro m both. Spinoza set about to find a unity 
and an ul tii!l8. te reality in God. So he reduced both mind 
and matter to attributes of one substance, or God, and 
reality is ae;ain one. If mind and matter are two as-
pects of the same thing , interaction cannot take place. 
But since both are attributes of the same substance, 
some relation ship must exist. That ~nich in one aspect 
is a mode of extens i on, or matter, in ano t her aspect 
may be a mode of thou.V1t, or spirit, a fact of conscious-
ness. The wro modes will be in exact correspondence, 
and a complete psycho-physical parallelism is the result. 
This is Spinoza's chief contribution to psychology, and 
because of the influence of his theory on later· work, 
and the place of parallelism in modern psychological 
controversy, should be noted. 
3. Lei biliz. 
.• Lei bniz, with his theories of modadali ty, 
again brin gs back the problem Descartes left with us. 
He sacrificed unity for individuality. Each monad is 
a separate and distinct little world. He circumvents 
his problem, rather than solve s it, by a scheme of pre-
• 
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established harmony. These monads are of varying com-
plexity , but all are endowed wit h consciousness, from 
the lo '.'.'e st t o the high e st, wlU.ch is soul or spirit. At 
bottom, all these monads are really spiritual, a sort 
of qualitative enerey, and matter, ultimately, is a 
series of unextended units of energy . The s oul, then, 
the most enlightened of the monads, becomes a centre of 
energy or activity, and consciousness is the activity 
of the soul. Vfuile these monads are individual, moved 
and influenced only fro m within, there is unity. Thi s 
unity lies in the plan or purpose o f the world in the 
mind of God. This is evidenced by the continuity which 
runs through all, from the lowest to the highest. Each 
monad mirrors the l i fe of the rest of the world. Th is 
is so true that if one might unfold all that is within 
a soul, or higner monad, one mi ght reveal the b eauty of 
the entire univ erse. This soul, as has been said, is 
t he centre of energy , and all the other monads are 
grouped about the soul in subordi nate rela tions, and 
appear to us as an orgp.nic body. 
The s OLll f ·;)llows its ovm l a ws. The body 
follows its own laws. But they a gree be cause of a pre-
established har mony -- "A contrivance of the divine fore-
knowledge, which h a s from the beginnin g formed each of 
these substances in so perfect, so regular, and a ccurate 
• 
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a manner that by merely following its ~rn laws, which 
were given to it vl.nen it c ame into being , each substance 
is Jret in harmony with the othe r, just as if there were 
a mutual influence between them, or as if God v1ere c on -
l 
t i nu a lly put ting hi s hand up on them. u-
D. Development of Materi a li sti c Theories . 
Th e bee;inrllr4::; of me. ter i alistic theories dates 
back to Leucippus anq Democritus, and has been noted 
in the first part of the c h ap te r . In the beginning of 
the mod ern p eriod of philosophy we f i nd Ba con tak ing 
up this v i e w, although not who l ly consistent, for he 
was ne ver willing to carry it to 1 ts ultimate c onclusions 
as did Hobbes, at whose hands materialistic psy chology 
reaches its h i c;hest d evelopment. La ter we find su ch 
men a s Pr i e stley and Ha rteley defending the s ame p osition. 
Bacon, though haile d generally as the foun der of the 
scientific school, seems mor e to b e drawing the conclusbns 
fro m the thought gathe red througn out the s i xteenth cen-
tury. His theor y of the soul is not quite consistent 
wi t h the rest of his materialistic views. The soul has 
a divine or rational part and an irrational part. The 
f ormer part is a sub ject for the philosoph y of reli g ion 
and does n o t concern psychology. The sensitive . s o ~.;l 
1. Third explanat ion , p. 331. Q,uoted by Rogers, 
History of Philosoph~, p. 314. 
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resides in the head and runs along the nervo u s system, 
and is refreshed by the blood in the arteries. The 
f a culties of this soul a.re understanding, reason, 
imagination, memory, appetite and will. The origin o f 
all these is purely physical. Yet Bacon himself never 
seemed able to decide just how far this theory would 
hold good, just how far perceptions can be caused with-
out c onsciousness. 
This doesn't trouble Hobbes. It is quite a 
simple process for him. His philosophy is really a 
doctrine of motion, and so his psychology naturally 
finds its basis in motion. Consciousness is identified 
with changes in the nervous sy stern. He be gins with 
. thought, for things that can be thought are the only . 
objects for such study. The origin of thought is sensation. 
Sensations are motions or modifications within the nervous 
system. Perception is the feeling of this action or 
motion within the brain. Memory is the persistence of 
the sensation or percept ion, a feeling of that which has 
once been f elt. Imagination is voluntary motion. Thus 
in the end, thought is feeling. Knowledge is the addition 
of sensations, perceptions and feelings. 
Sensations and perceptions are necessarily, f or 
Hobbes, purely. subjective, the same conclusion arrived 
· at long be fore by Democritus, Protagoras and Aris tippus. 
• 
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What is p Rrceived cannot be an external object, but 
a modification of the motion excited within the nervous 
substance by an external motion. All objective phenomena 
is an allusion. 
The soul Hobbes sometimes calls action, and 
sometimes nervous substnnce, but always he describes tt 
as a physical body, too refined to be caught by the 
physical senses. 
This extreme materialism persisted in England 
in spite of the influence of the continental Rationalists. 
Hobbes' assertion that substances are bodies and Locke's 
hypothesis that matter can think gained further popularity 
when Leibniz substituted energy for extension as the chief 
attribute of matter. Some of the later materialists , 
like Diderot and Buchner, thought they saw i n Leibniz' 
contribution another solution to the problem. They 
thought they could recognize an .· influence 0f body on 
mind without completely materializing mind, and developed 
what is called a psycho-physical materialism. 
How-€ver, H[-rtley and Priestley could not get 
avvay from the . strict materialism of Hobbe s . The soul 
for them was separate and distinct from the body, but 
nevertheless a corporeal substance. The soul and body 
are parallel in development, but the soul depends upon 
the body. For all these, however, espec i ally Diderot, 
the Whole universe is in a perp etual state of change 
• 
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and fermentation, and can be explained only mechanically. 
Haeck&l, 1877, adopted a biological basis, 
stating tba t the cell was the basis for the psychical 
as well as the physical life. From this point the m~in 
theories drop back to a psycho-physical parallelism, or 
let the question become merely secondary, as with Spencer. 
E. Rise of Empiricism. 
Again, for the origin of empirical psychology 
we have to tul"n back to P.ris to tle. We see its beginnings 
in Hobbes and Bacon, but we must turn to Locke ( 1632-1704) 
to see it in its fUll significance. 
Locke begins by getting rid of all unnecessary 
and unproved ideas, and then builds his constructive 
system. First of all, t here are no innate ideas. Chil-
dren, idiots and illiterates surely have no ideas that 
are in ~~y way to be considered innat e. To say that am 
idea is innate, is to say that a mind may have an ide·a 
and not be conscious o f it. To say that mind is ignorant 
of its idea is to leave the idea without meanin g . For 
an idea to have mean ing is for it to "perce ived and to 
be understood by the u:nierstanding." But all perceptions 
come from experience from the external world. To be sure 
some ideas are found very early ln the mind, but t.lJ.ey, 
upon close examination, will be found to be ac quired, and 
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not innate. The universal acceptance o f mankind to 
certain truths is no t a proof that they are innate. 
Ever;yon e h ears these truths from so me one else. More-
over, there is not universal as sent to the tru.ths that 
we thinlc are innate in all. But the capacity for ideas, 
the capacity for the reception of impressions, is the 
only iml.a te quality, ·and one not to be denied. 
So having dispensed with innate ideas, by 
these and other o:"e;un1ents, he starts with a mind that 
is blank as a sheet of paper or a wax tablet, and faces 
his first task of discpv ering what, then, is the origin 
of our ideas. Experie n ce is the source of all ideas, 
of all e:xperience. This experience consists of all the 
observations we make of external objects or of internal 
wc:rkings of our minds. So our knowledge come s from just 
two sources, sensation and reflection, knowledge of the 
external world ' from sensation, and knowledge of the 
internal operation of the mind by reflection. Ideas are 
simp·le and complex. Simple ideas are of four kinds; 
those which come fro m one sense; those tha t come from 
more than one sense; those tha t come from reflection; 
and those that come from refl ections and sensation • 
Sounds, colors, tastes, etc. are examples of the first 
ki nd. Space, motion, fi g ure and rest may be cited as 
illustrating the second class of s i mple ideas. Perception 
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and volition are arrived at by reflection. Ideas of 
pleasure, pain, unity, succe ssion or po·wer, and many 
other s j_milar ideas, can be brought into the mind only 
by sensation and reflection. Complex ideas are arrived 
at by three methods: by combining several simple ideas; 
by sett ing several ideas up for comparison; and by 
abstracting the idea from its context; or these may be 
brought umer the heads of Mode s, Substances and Relation. 
The formation of ideas then presupposes six 
faculties of the understanding: perception, retention, 
discernment (between the different ideas), comparison, 
composition, (joining several ideas together) and 
abstraction. In perception the mind is passive. In 
the next step s it be gins to .b e active, and in the last 
three are the three great activitie s of the mind, com-
paring ideas , compound1 n g ide as , and abstracting ideas. 
But still the question remains, concerning 
vrhat things may we have knowledge? By intuition we have 
knowledge of our mvn exls tence. By demon stra tion we 
may have knowledge of God. By sensation we may have 
knowledge of the physical world. 
With thls background we may now look into the 
present theorie s of consciousness, and consider the effect 
of these upon our religious thinking. 
• 
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II. Methods of Interpreting Psychological 
Data 
----- --
A. Structuralism vs. Functionalism - Gestalt 
Psychologie. 
In every experience we are able to distinguish 
between the act of experiencing and the object of that 
experience. Mental content is co!nplex, and the tota l 
content of consc iousness at any one given moment may be 
analyzed into conscious elements. But a process of ex-
perience at any one given moment of experience is a 
single act of consciousness and cannot be further analyzed. 
For almost every type of experience we have two ways of 
describin g it, denoting e i ther process or content. In 
so speaking we do not intend to convey the meaning that 
we have two different kinds of experience, but simply 
are describing two aspects of the same experience. 
Take the term Qerception. We may define per-
ception as the consciousness of material objects as they 
stimulate a certain sense organ, or it may be the very 
process of forming percepts . From the first point of 
view perception may be analyzed into sensations ~nd 
memory-images, from the other aspect it is not analyzable 
and simply presupposes at least two preceding processes 
of sense stimulations. 
Again, take a cognitive experience, as memory. 
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We may describe it as a process of retention and recall, 
of remembering, or as a memory-ima~e, again analyzable 
into its elements. we may distinguish between the 
me ntal act of thinking, and the thought or idea, the 
content of consciousness durin3 the act of thinking. 
These two me thods of approach are open to 
the student of psychology, and it is difficult to see 
how any study of the subject can be complete alone 
from either standpoint for analysis is always abstract. 
But the di stinguishing of the two and the acceptance 
of the one to the utter exclusion of the other have led 
to the development of two opposing schools of psychology, 
the Structuralists, perhaps best represented by Pr0-
fessor Ti~hener, and the Functionalists, represented 
by Professor Angell and others. 
1. Structuralism. 
Professor Ti tchener co:r.pares the structuralist 
and functionalist methods in psychology to morphology 
and physiology in biology, calling attention himself 
to the static nature of morphology against the dynamic 
nature of physiology or functional psychology. Yet he 
doesn't seem quite content to carry out the comparison, 
for he says also that psychology is the science of 
mental processes, preferring ~recess to content because 
the content of consciousness is continually changing. 1 
1. "The Postulates of a Structural Psychology"-Fhil~Rev., 
8 ( 18 98) ' p. 44 9 
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He further modifies this by saying that mental Et ructure 
. refers to the qualitative asp e ct and process or mental 
1 
act to the durational aspect. By gualitative he means 
what kind, whether color, tone emotion etc., while by 
durational he oeans a momentary phase in the mental life. 
However, since insisting upon the static aspect 
of psychology as the true scientific approach, a "science 
of mental states" would more nearly describe the science 
as Professor Titchener evidently sees it. This method 
is to take the total state of consciousness at any one 
given time and analyze 1 t into its constituent parts, 
and then again to synthesize these elements to show how 
they combine in forming the complex psychosis. Through-
out, "analyze" is the keynote :Jf this method. Profes.sor 
Titchener further points out that the Str .1ctural method 
arose as a reaction agai nst "faculty psychology." The 
historical condition of psychology rendered it inevitable 
that, when the time came for transformation from philosophy 
to science, problems should be formulated, explicitly ·or 
implicitly, as static rather than dynamic, structural 
rather than functi onal. 
1. 
2. 
2 The real problem, thinks Mat'shall, is for 
wxperimental Psychology of the Thought Processes, p. 60 
Psychic Function and Psychic Structure" - Mind, 23 
0.91~ , 185ff. --
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the structuralist to determine the characteristics that 
are common to all sensations. While proclaiming the 
~dvantaees o f funct ionalism, he nevertheless holds that 
structuralism is necessary in order to have a true con-
cept ion of the nature of consciousness, for all "menta l 
items" are emph.'1Ses within the psychic system and should 
be carefully analyzed and described. By mental items 
he means specific sensations. These appear in corres-
pondence with special activiti e ~ in special parts of the 
1 brain. If this is true, then Marshall concludes that 
ne ururgic appearances in a certain part of the nervous 
system would show the nervo us ~~aracteristics of the 
whole system, and all parts of the correlated nervous 
system wculd be recip rocally efficient. By the s arne 
argument consciousness wculd have to be of the same 
fundamental nature throughout. The mental item, or 
specific sensations, would show the character of the 
whole psychic system, and all parts of consciousness 
would be reciprocal ly efficient. If the diversities of 
nervous processes are but phases or asp ects of one funda-
mental process, then, too, the apparent diversities im 
the psychical sys tern are but phases of one fundamenta 1 
mental process. Thus Marshall points out that the 
structuralist cannot go on alone, but needs the function-
1. Ibid, p. 187 
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alist to complete his science. 
Every mental item has five inherent qualities 
of relationship: (1) so me me asure- 8 f comp lexity, (2) 
a ms asure of intensity, (3) some degree of a gneableness 
or disagreeabl eness, (4) some degree of stability or 
realness, and (5-) some te mporal qua lification . In t h ese 
five relationships or qualities is the comp lexity of the 
mental item. If this is true, all five must exist at 
any moment of consideration, although one or more may 
not be emphatic enough to be observed. These f ive 
qualities are the basis for the five relationships of 
voluntary attention, objectivity, belief, memory,and ex-
pectation.1 
Professor Ti tchener. feels tt.at his science is 
quite co mple t e without the aid of the Functionalist a ·s 
offered by Marshall. He says that it is quite natural 
that Tie should be disappointed with the dissective method 
of explaining feeling , emotion, · reason, or self, unless 
we have the viewpoint of the dissector, 2 and if we have 
not that viewpoint he sul?ely does not. waste his sympathy 
on us. The one task of the psychologist is to "isi.ate 
the constituents in a g iven conscious formation. His 
task is vivisection, but a vivisection that shall yield 
1. "Psychic Function and Psychic Structure 11 -Mind, 23 
(1914), p. 193 
2. Philosonhical Review, 7 ( 1898), 451. 
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structul';'al, not functional, results 11 • 1 Find out what 
is in consciousness and in what quantity, but nGver 
be cone erne d with wh;y or what for . 
The various structuralists start with a 
common point, that sensations are the elementary mental 
processes. But there is division in the camp when it 
comes to dete1~ ining the scope of sensations, and whether 
they are the only elementary processes. Wundt would use 
the term sensation to cover both peripherally and 
centrally excited processes. Kftlpe agrees, provided the 
two types of sensations are treated differently, because 
of their normally different characteristics. Ziehen e.nd 
Ebbinghaus hold that there is a sharp distinction between 
the sensation produced by a per ipheral stimulus and an 
idea and so i nsist that they are two dis tinct elements. 
All make careful distinctions between sensations and 
affectio ~s. MUnsterberg would not admit that feeling is 
elementary, but maintained that it was reducible to 
sensat ions accompanying motor activity. Ti tchener points 
out these differences2---and then draws his own conclusions 
that there are two elementary mental processes, affection 
and sensation, sensation covering both the externally 
aroused sensation and the idea. Both affection and sen-
sation are irreducible for introspection. Miss Calkins 
holds that there are three elementary factors - sensations, 
1. Phil. Rev., 7 (1898), 450 
2. Ibid, p. 457 
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affections and relations. 1 
Every p.sychical element has two attributes, 
quality and i ntensity. Q, CJ.ality is spec i f i c and indiv-
dual, is wha t makes us say a thing is blue, or so 'r, 
or a certain tone. Intensity is c ommon to all mental 
elements, bo t h sensations and affections. Professor 
Titchener thirurs that a perfect element would always 
show qualit y, intensity, dur a tion and a superficial 
extension. 2 An affective element would show there , and 
a sense element would also show clearness, bu t only in 
some cases, extent. Intensity and clearness are relative 
while quality is intrinsic and individual~ Clearness 
is the attribute t hat distinguishes sensation from 
affection. "Clearness" seems to be more of a descriptive 
word, one to be appli ed to more complex mental states 
than sensat ions. Is it not rather an attribute of 
attention? Clearness denotes comparison, and there would 
have to b e at le ast two si multaneous sensations, and pure 
sensation no longer exists, but perception. 
2. Functionalists. 
The first objection rais ed by the Functionalists 
to .the Structuralist position is its abstract character, 
the second is its static character, and the third is 
that it does not describ e mental processes in their totality. 
1. 
2. 
A First Book in Psycholory, p. 14. 
Ph ilosophical Review, 71918), 461 
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The what is not sufficient, we must also know the 
!fhat for, f or every mental what is a process striving 
toward an end. Yet nowhere is mental function clearly 
defined. The function of a mental process is to aid 
in ad jus tmen t. 11 All our sen sa tion~', says Professor 
-
Angell, "all our emotion s and all our acts of will must 
be regar ded a s so many ex:;J ression s of or gan i c adapta-
" 
1 ~ t b t i on t o 01..1r envir onment • !!.tach pr ocess mus e des -
' 
6ribed in its totali t y to satisfy the Functionalist. 
~ro fese or Angell says that the Structuralists recogni ze 
only one ba s ic form of mind stuff, sensa tion, tha t simplic-
2 ity is their one virtue. 
St out and Baldwin speak of the "cla s s ification 
of mental function" as the distinction of the fundamental 
cons tituents of ever y concrete state of consci ousne s s.3 
But this is not what is me ant by modern functionalists. 
That co nception of the term is used in conne ction with 
intr ospection , while the modern functionalist is interested 
pur e l y i n observation , observation of behavior, a b iolog-
ical rather than a psycholog ical intere s t. 
Professor Angell, the outstand ing Functionalist, 
i n claiming prestige for his method, says that Function-
alism is a point of view, a vision, that it traces back 
to Aristotle, and was advocated by Spenc er and Darwin, 
that Functionalism is an "effort to discern ana :p or tray 
1. Psychology , p. 7. 
2. Qhap~ers fro m Modern __ r..§_ychology, p. 13 
3. Dictiona~ of Phi~ospphy and Psychology, Vol.l, p. 188 
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typical operations of consciousness under actual life 
c :.;ndi tions, while structural psycholog y attemp ts to 
analyze and describe its elementary and complex con -
tents."1 Structural psychology undertak es t o determine 
the number and characte r of various unanalyzable sensory 
materials, such as color, taste, tone, etc. Functional 
psychology is interested in the character o f sense 
activities and their differences in "modu s op erandi". 
"The functionalalist is committed vom Grunde auf to the 
avo idance of that special form of the p sycholog ist's 
fallac y which c 0nsists i n attributi ng to .the mental 
states wi t hout due warrant, as part of their constitu tion 
in the moment of experi ence, characteristics vklich subsequent 
reflective analysis leads us to suppose they must hav e 
posse ssed.tt2 
The Functionalist sees fur ther difficulty in 
the Structuralist's theor y , be c ause we can never have 
the same idea t wice, and when recalled we have no assurance 
tr1at it is the same. But function persist s i n mental 
as well as physical life. We may have a s often as v:e 
wish contents that mean the same thin g , and alway s the 
func t ion involved is the same • 
In analyzing a state of consciousness the first 
discovery is that the mental elements a re d ep endent on 
1. Psych.Rev., 14, (1907), 62 
2. · P~ch · E£.Y ., 14, ( 1907), 65 
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the conditions that gave ri 2e to then. They depend 
entirely on circumstances, both subject ani obj e ct in 
their totality. If you p r obe deeply into a s pe cific 
sens a tion, you always find the questions of t he manner 
i n vih i ch it was a r ous ed and the r e ason why i nvolved. 
You may abstract them and so n ot answer them, b u t the 
result is scientifically incomplete. H~J eYer the 
Structur a list would insist t~~ t the abstract method i s 
scientifically co mplete, end the what far ar~ the why 
involve other fields than psychology. But in the end, 
the descri ption is in terms o f the conditions or cir-
cumstances under which it was pra:.J.uced, in the terms 
of the resultant ac t ion, the descri p tion is function-
alistic. 
The c onclusion is, then, that the primary 
i ntere s t of the Function al i st is biolog ical. He attemp ts 
to discover how the psychical c ont rl b t.J.tes to the total 
of organic activities. Functionalism is intere s ted in 
mental activi ties simply as a b iolog ical force i n the 
adaptation of the or ga ni sm to environme nt, the relation 
o f the psychica l to evolution. Unlike Behaviorism, it 
recognizes the importance of mind in modifying both 
action and environme nt, but con siders mind a s p rimarily 
a mediating a gency be twe en the orga nis m in i t s struggle 
an d the environ me nt, it is the "psychology of the funda-
mental . utilities of con sciousness 11 .1 
1. Angell, Psych. Rev., 14, (1907), 85 
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On the other hand the Structuralist thinks 
the Functionalist point of v lew incomplete. It is 
just a "collective name for a s ystem of functions of 
the psycho-physical organism" •1 It is purely descrip-
tive. - Verbal nouns abound, such as memQ.£Y_, recognition, 
imagination, judgment, volition. They are used in the 
s~1e way as locomotion or digestion, and that the under-
lying processes are psychical is accidental as far as 
the Functionalist is c oncerned. Functionalism may be 
termed mental nhysiology.2 
Marshall terms functionalism a "Process 
Psychology" •3 He says that the tendency to postulate 
a special process to account for each new mental e xper-
ience started with the Greeks. They postulated intellec-
tion and conation. Kant added feeling to these, and 
these three are largely acc.epted today. Bren tano was 
the first really to break from this Kantian position. 
. . 
He added judgment or b e lief, and made feeling a~aspect 
of conation. 4 
Certa~1ly neither functionalism nor structural-
ism csn claim the entire -field of psychology. If the 
explanation of every mental element involves a functional 
description, surely every description of function involves 
a structural element. What is needed is not the sharp 
1. Titcheliiler, Phil.Rev. 7, (1898 )~ p. 452 
2. Ibid, p. 452 
3. Mind, 23, (1914), 18lf. 
4. Dictionary of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 188 
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distinction between the two, but a development of both 
and a recognition of the relation of the two. As long 
as psycholog y confines itself to the structural, we may 
be avoiding the danger of trespassing in the field of 
biology or of becoming too philosophical in our science, 
but if we cannot tell what corillciousness is withou t tell-
ing what consciousness goes, then vre need to know both 
how and why as well as what. 
Miss Calkins offers a number of criticisms of 
bo t h methods and also attempts a rec .-:mciliation of the 
1 two. She says that structuralism as a method is both 
self-consistent and scientifically possible, but is open 
to two main criticisms. (1) It neglects a part of 
immediate consciousness. The science of an idea involves 
the que s tion, "Whose idea?" A..'1y account of the self is 
omitted. (2) Structuralism does not adequately describe 
the different ~orms of human experience. Perception, 
recognition, thought, emotion, wi 11, and faith cannot 
be completely described when analyzed into structural 
e l e me~ts and referr ed to bodily conditions. 2 She also 
gives two chief criticisms of Functionalism. (1) Psych-
ology as a "science of mental function", as reaction 
directed t~vard environment, also disregards the self. 
As an idea involves the question, "Whose idea"? so does 
function involve a functio ner -- and the functioning 
1. First Book in Psychology, Ap ~1endix, Sec. I, 8 1. w "A 
Rec Jnciliation between Structural and Functional 
;psychology", Psych.-Rev., 13, ( 1906), pp. 61-81 
2. First Book . in Psychology, pp. 273, .274 
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self, as the self, the subject, must be studied. 
(2) Functionalism either results in a synonym for 
self-psychology, or is only partial in its scope • 
If functi on is reac t ion to environrrent, and 
if environment is social as well as physical, then 
function is a social relation, a ~rsonal attitude. 
But if function is used in a more strictly b iological 
sense, as merely reaction, it c en explain and classify 
psychic phenomena, but it cannot describe it psycholo8-
l ically. 
However, Professor Angell rather redeems him-
self here wbe n he says, "To be conscious of an object 
involves not only s ome mental presentation o f the object, 
but also some subJect t o whom it is presented. Conscious-
2 
ness has no other poss l ble meaning." 
Miss Calkins would combine the two methods on 
the basis of the consc ious self. This she thinks is 
pes si ble be cause the conscious self is both analyzable 
into elements and a complex of relations to society and 
and physical environment.3 
3. Gestalt PsJrchologie. 
A third method of approach to the problem of 
psycholog~ wh ich has aroused no little interest in 
Germany, and to some extent in America·, is found fn the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Fi r st Book in Ps~chology, pp. 274-276 
Psychology, p. 4 2 · 
Psy ch . Rev., 13, (1906), 63 
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Gestalt Psychologie. The movement began with an 
article by Von Ebren-:'9lS on "Gestalt qualit!l.tun", pub-
lished in 1890, but not until Wertheimer's publication 
of his paper on experimental studi3s of the pe rception 
movement, in 1912, was the theory given a real scie ~1tific 
starting point. Today it is a leading school in ex-
periment al psychology in Germany. Its chief representa-
tion are . K8bler and Koff'ka, and in the United States, 
R. M. Ogden of Cornell University. 
The origina l problem grew out of a s tudy 
of pe rcep t1on. The con cept has developed in four 
directions: (1) The ap p roach as shown by Wertheimer 
in a study of perception and movement. K8ble r , however, 
is not interested in i t s relation to physiological 
correlates of percept ion. ( 2) The approach through 
~"f'\. 
the "Ge iste swisschaftu, 
. .,. or the study of mental life 
as a ·whole. (3) The Genetic apprc:a ch, as represented 
by Kreuger. (4) The approach through personality, as 
represented by Stern, which maintains that unity does 
not c ~nsist in the summation of traits, but in the 
harmonization of all psychical processes in the individual 
into an active pr :lnc iple. 
Koffl'\:a defines psychology when he says tha t 
i ts "problem is the scientific study of the behavior of 
living creatures i n their contact with the outside world". 
"Every act of behavior is the expression · of an individual 
depending more or less upon his entire constitution and 
• 
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we. can never understarxl his behavior completely unless 
we ltnow him as a whole". l This gives the key to the 
theor y , ex~ ri ence must be treated as a whole. So 
additions are made to our psychological vocabulary by 
such words as for~-" J2§J:.,tern, group!B&_ and, especially 
configuration, Gestalt. In a Ge s t a lt each element 
(object) contr i butes something to the whole, and all the 
elements are interdependent, am not simply additive. 
If a single element is missing, the particular Gestalt 
no longer exists. For instance, s e eing A ·am B together 
is something more and above see ing A t B. The A B is a 
totality. In seelne; a group of objects we pe rceive 
the group as a whole. Gestalten, or confi gurations, 
are found not only in visual perceptions, b ut also in 
e.uditor-~ and other sense faculties. Nor are they confined 
to sense perce ption, but apply to memory, habit, thinlcing , 
etc. 
The problem is, then, what produces a particular 
configuration? The conditions are of two kinds; conditions 
Within the organism, and condi t ions out side the organism -
the acting stimuli. 
This seems to be not so much a new theory as 
a new name f or some older ways of thinking , with some 
elaborations and modifications. The traditional analysis 
of perception into sensation, association and at t ention, 
1. Growth of Mind, p. 4. 
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Koffka thinks does not include all the fe.cts, and for 
them he woul d substitute attitude. "Attitude is a 
readiness to carry out a structural process." 1 
Reaction to stimuli depends on attitude. K.o ffka's 
co ncep tion of structure is synthetic, rather than 
analytic, essential characters being derived fr om the 
who le rather than the elements. Experimentation brought 
out the fact th at experience of an item alone is different 
froo experience of that item as a part o f a group . 
Structure always appear s on a ground. There would be 
no experience of ground alone, for that would be equiva-
lent to no consciousness at all. The grourD is reacted 
to n ggatlvely and the figure positively. 
The theory has the advantac;e from the first 
of treating experience as a whole, the idea of unity. 
It is a frank recognition of co~Eciousness, and a healthy 
swing i ng away fro m atomistic psychology. 
4. Purposive Psychology . 
Professor McDougal l has recently made some 
interesti ng contributions to method in what he is pleased 
to term purposive psycho~. The aim o f his Outline of 
Psycholo_sy, he says, is to pre sent the subj:)ct to the 
student as "the sciences o f the min:l, for which purposive 
striving is a fundamental .category, which regard the pro-
cess of purposive striving as radically different from 
l. Kof f ka, Psych. Bulletin, 19 (1922), p. 549 
• 
• 
- 46 -
1 
mechanica l sequence... He denies the pos s ibility of 
interpreting th e sequence of mental events in a 
2 
" mechanical chain of cause and effectn • But what 
is t o be ?T' .r. t ti tude t ow a r 1 physiolog lca 1 knowledge, 
especially regardi n g the structure and fUnction of the 
nerv ous s y stemJ We are f o rced to use the old term 
. 
gind, but it must be de fined anevr. B~r the mi nd of the 
individual o r g ani s m we mean "that which expresses it-
s el f in his experience and in his behavior; and we have 
to build up our de scrip t ion of the human mind by gather-
ing all p ossible facts of human experience and behavior, 
an d by inferr i ng fr om these the nature and structure 
of the mind". 3 
His Outline of Psychology is lare ely a polemic 
a gainst mechanical, atomistic, or "mosaic" theories, of 
mental pr ::lces:ses. To consider psych olog y as the study 
of experience, Pr ofessor licDougall thinks , is a self-
denying theor y , dragging i n unnecessary metaphysical 
c ontrover sy , and to b e to l erc..ted on l y by pu:c·e idea lis t s. 4 
"Psychology o f ideas" he d i scard s on general princ i p les 
as inco n s i sten t and u n intelli gible. 5 Ps ychology, as the 
.§Q.).ence o f c onsciousnes s is sub j ect to t h e s ame criticism 
as t h e study o f exper_ie nc~, r:- nd anyway , con s ciousne ss 
l. Preface, p. 8. 
2. Ibid. 
3. PSyCh. Rev., 29, (1922), p. 36 
4. Outline of Psycholo gy, p. 12 
5. lQid, 1, p. 13 
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is such a thoroughly bad word that it has been a "great 
misfortune for psychology that the word . has come into 
1 general usen. So he defines psychology as "the science 
of human mind", adding, "we may make the definition 
more exact by addi ng the words "positive" and "emp irical'' 
to mark the fact that psychology relies upon the grea t 
method common to all the natural sciences, namely 
observation of concrete facts ani the induction of general 
rules or laws from these concrete -particulars, rather than 
upon deduction from an a nriori principle; "positive" 
to make it as the scie nee of mind as it actually exists 
and operates to distinguish it from the sciences primarily 
concerned .with the ideals, nouns, standards, or rules of 
2 
right thinking or conduct.'' Description of the human 
-
mind is to be bull t up "by inference from the observed 
facts of behavior, the behavior of men and of animals, 
and fro m the obs erved facts of exper:1e nee, facts of his 
own expe riences observed introspectivel y and facts of 
o t hers' experie nee s described and recorded by themtt. 3 
Professor McDougaJ.l almost startles us into 
thinking that he is about to open negotiati ons with t h e 
Self-J? sychologis ts when he asserts that the two fundamental 
facts of experience are the exp eriencing of so me ob j ect 
1. Ibid , p. 16 
2. Ibid, p . 38 
3. Ibid 
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and the subject, (some person!) to whom or of whom this 
experiencing is. "That is to say, experience, as we know 
it, is always the thinking of some subj ect of or about 
1 
some object". But he saves himself fro m such a fate 
when he says that this some one, this subject, is always 
a material organism, or is embodied in, and manilrests 
itself to us through the medium of ~at~ria~ org_anism. 2 
Holding to such a conception of the self in order to avoid 
metaphysical difficulties, Professor McDougall then ad-
heres to the older s ::..ul hypothesis, a theory which, re-
jected almost unanimously now by modern psychology, creates 
more metaphysical difficulties, than his definition of 
the self does away with. For the soul is something other 
than, more than, cons cious expericence, and is not identi-
fl ed in any way with consciousness. The soul, for Pro-
fessor McDougall, is not, however, the traditional, under-
lying pr:inci p le, but what he calls "a sum of enduring 
capacities", 3 a sort of potentiality of con sciouness, 
a vague and difficult C8nception to grasp. 
Throughout, behavior is purposive . Purposive 
means, in the sense here used, that in the process of 
or ganic evolution the goal of the process is progressively 
created and defined. He is pleased to call this the 
1. Ibid, p • 40 
2. Ibfd 
3. Body and Mind, p. 359 
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hormic theory,meanin8 a vi tal impulse or urge to 
action. 1 ~his is the fundamental factor to be con-
sidered in all observation of behavior, whether of 
others or introspective . 
1. Out line of Psychology, p. 72 
• 
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III. Present Outstanding Theories 
______ of ~~n&£~--o~.~s~n~e~s~s~·~----------
A. Associationism • 
The phrase association of ideas was first 
used by John Locke. In the fourth edition of his "Essay 
concerning Human Understanding" ( 1700) he added a chap-
ter entitled "Of the Association of Ideas", in which 
he says: "Some of our ide a s have a natural corresponCl cn ce 
am connection w1 th one another: it is the office and ex-
cellency of our reason to trace these and hold them 
together in that union and correspondence wh i ch is 
founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this there is 
another connection of ideas wholly owine; to chance or 
custom. Ideas that in themselves are not at all of a 
kin come to be so uni ted in some men's minds that it is 
very hard to separat e them; they always keep in company, 
and the one no sooner at any time comes into the under-
standing, but its as so cia te appears with it; and if they 
~re more than two which are thus united, the W!lole gang, 
always inseparable, shovv themselves together. This strong 
combination of ideas not allied by nature the mind makes 
in itself either voluntary or by chance, and hence it 
comes in different men to be very different, according 
to their different inclinations, education, interest, 
1 
etc". 
1. Bk • I I , ch • 3 3 , s 5 , 6 • 
• 
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H Wever Lock e's int erest in the question was 
• 0 ' 
primarily ethical, epistemological and pedagogical, rather 
than pur ely psychological. He used the term idea in a 
genera l sense, applying it to all types of mental con-
tent. 
Hobbes's conception of association as the mode 
of suc c e s sion of ideational experiences, based on the 
Aristotelian classification, is usually considered the 
basis for the associ a tion the ary, although Hobbes's 
psychology was purely sensatl onalistic. It was :teft for 
David Hume to narrow the meaning of the term idea to our 
present understanding of it. 
The ei@l teenth and nineteenth century psychol ogists 
recognized t hat sensations give rise to trains of memory, 
imag ination ani tho Jght, and their con cern was to discover 
t he principle of the sequence of these ideas and to de-
termine their rel a tionships. The general conclusion was 
th :=.t the antecedent of such a train of mental processes 
may be a sensation, percep tion or idea, but that the 
lt i 1 'd l resu s a ways an 1 ea. 
Since one of the chief problems of philosophy 
is the interpretation of experience, and s ince the chief 
problem c f p sychology is to explain the occurrence of 
mental phenomena i n experience, we are no t surprised to 
find philos_ophers and psychologists of the period, 
Berkeley and Hartley, Hume and Spencer, Locke, J. S. Mill 
l . It will be noted that associati oni sm is t hus structural 
i n method. 
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and Hobbes, idealist and materialist, skeptic and 
agnostic, monist and dualist, all joining in the attempt 
to analyze the sequence of mental processes that they 
had discovered. 
The general aim of this school of psychology 
is to account for all the facts of conscious life, 
~xcept sensations, as the products of associational 
processes. The chief problem then is to analyze the 
complex mental processes into elementary experiences, 
arrl then to shovr how the elements are synthesized by 
the fact of assoc:la ti on, and to formulate the laws 
governing this process. 
Hobbes, with his sensationalism,represents 
the cruJ.e beginning of the accomplishment of this task. 
For him, a+l mental processes are derived from sensa tions 
or are "decadent 11 sensations. But in his sy s tem he f ound 
no way to refute innate ideas. His system was bull t 
on a psycho-physical basis. 
Locke sought to meet the difficulty in expla in-
ing more complex mental processes by emphasizing reflection 
with sensation as the two formulative elemen t s of ex-
perience. 
Berkeley divided mental content int o two kinds 
of ideas, ideas of sen se and idea s of imagination, the 
former being stronger, more distinct and more coheren t. 
• 
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He said that the modes of association were similarity, 
causality,· and coexistence or contiguity, and lai d great 
stress on simultaneous assoc:la. tion. The succession of 
sensations, however, is due to the power of the Deity, 
and the alteration in ideas is caused by an "incorporeal 
1 
active substance or spirit". 
Hume sought to clear Locke's analysis by re-
jecting reflection as a separate source of experience. 
Sensation and ideation are the only types of experience, 
and ideation is only a faint co ny of sensation. His 
was the f 1r st atteq1pt at a thorough classification of 
the modes of associ ation. These are three, resemblance, 
contiguity in time or place, and c <mse and effect. 
Experience is divided into impressions and idea s. 
Impressions consist of sensations, passions and emotions. 
Ideas are of two sorts, mEmory and imagination, and are 
faint copies of impressions . Basing his work on 
Berkeley and Locl~J h e did much to bring associationism 
into popularity. 
David Hartley, starti ng with a dualism of mind 
and matter, divided the mental side of experience, or 
"internal feelingsu , into sensations and ideas. Ideas 
are either ideas of sensation or intellect:Jal ideas, 
and "the ideas of sensat ion are the elements of m ich 
1. Principles of Human Knowledge, s 26 
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1 
all the rest a re compounded". The human mind is 
endowed wi th faculties o f "memory, imaginati on or 
2 fancy, understan ding, affection s and will". He would 
reduce all modes of as sociation to c on tigui t y. In re-
gard to the mor e complex me n tal ph enomena he takes a 
broader view than Locke, Berkeley or Hume. He intro-
duced the principle of mot or con comitants into the 
a ssociation theory. This emphasis on the motor aspect 
of consciousness and the derivation of thought and 
reasoning from imagery are his t wo main contributions. 
It was for J ames and John Stuart Mill and 
Ba in to br i ng the theory to its highest f o rm "before the 
r adical changes of Spencer. J ames Mill vie wed the mind 
as a machine, set in operation by external forces, i.e., 
sensory stimuli, ani operated as a physical mechanism. 
The whole func t ion of associ a tionism is to bind experience 
tog ether. It does no t reconstruct or modif y mental 
materia l , but merel y c em ents the separat e eleme nts, and 
by rep etition, bundle s o f unified processes b ecome 
"indissoluble", and beli ef is the re sult. His thorough 
ana lysis of belie f , his assertion that it contains an 
orig inal eleiiBnt not to b e iden tified with sensation or 
idea, nor yet attributive to ass ociation, was his addition 
to the cause. 
1. Observa tiona on Men. Introd. 
2. Ibid. 
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John Stue.rt Mill objected to the elder Mill 1 s 
use of introspective analysis, arrl thought the diff'iculty 
cculd be solved by substituting a chemical analogy theory 
for the mechanical view of as soc ia tlon. Associ at ion 
could transform as well as unite ideas. He also thou ght 
that belief contained some distinctive element which made 
it primordially different from either sensa tion or ideation. 
Bain elaborat ed upon and modified the work o f 
the Mills, and in addition laid much stress on the 
physiological concomitants of mental processes. Sensi-
bility and contractibility of muscle were his two primary 
constituents. 
But with the sense of growth and development 
in e verything else, it was becoming difficult to think 
of mind as the one static thing. It could not longer· 
be thought of as tabula~ at birth of the individua l, 
when the individual inherited its whole race history. 
If the individual inherited its whole race history. 
If the indi vidua 1 does not inherit actual exp eriences, 
he inherits cap·aci ties for experience. So Spencer 
attempted to bring together Darwinian evolutionary biol-
ogy, his ~~n evolutionary philosophy and association 
p sychology . Association ism could no longer be based 
on a mechanistic theory of experience but must be inter-
preted in the light of organic p rocesses. Nervous 
function s came to · play a g reat part in psychical processes. 
Thought experience was not identified with neural activity, 
but physical processes are the pattern f or p sychical 
• 
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processes. 
While these men were working in England, 
Condillac, Bonnet, Taine and Ferri were developing 
a similar system in France and . Italy. Johann Friedrich 
Herbart, in his reaction against Kantian apriorism, was 
worlring along the same line in Germany. He thought that 
expe:rience cons is ted of simple elementary impressions. 
Hov1ever, he emphasized the antae;onlsm rather than the 
association of mental elements. 
In much this form associationism is accepted 
tcx:lay by many psychologist s . Particularly appealing is 
it to tho se intere s ted in experimental psycholog y, and 
many leading psychologists not professi ng t o be 
associationists have nevertheless been carryin~ on some 
valuable experiments, as Gal ton 1 s experiments in recency, 
Ebbinghaus in association and t ime, ! iss Calkins in 
frequence and recency, Kirkpatrick in associative recall 
and recognition, the Carr experiments with animals in 
motor· association, and the Cattell experiments in Leipzig. 
Mllnsterberg and Wundt have both done valuable work in 
this connection. 
While there are of course many dJ.V erging 
opinions among the as s o cia tionlists, there is nevertheless 
a well defined centr~l pr~nciple ac cepted by all. All 
agree that the associ ation of experiences is fundamental. 
• 
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The operation of this association is variously inter-
preted. Some would explain it as a f~ operating 
on mental processes, and driving them into a certain 
sequence. Others regard it simply as a fact of sequenee 
and_ offer no other explanation. Th e majority, though, 
regard it as a unifying process, some holding that it 
is entirely mechanical, as did James Mill, but more 
accep ting the chemical analogy or combination theory, 
:permitting _t he f~.,;.sion or transformation of ideas as 
well as unifyi :ng them. In the act of associative syn-
thesis elementary mental data combine or coalesce into 
comrJe x experi ences. This, as was said, may be a mere 
~ouping or an actual transformation. 
More and more the associationists are accepting 
the physical or neural concomitant theory of mental pro-
cesses, but just how the complex neural processes are 
related to the mental proce sses is S:.ill variously inter-
preted. The generally accep ted view, according to H. C. 
Warren, is that "sensory exclta tl on leaves some disposi_ 
tion, trace, or modification in the brain substance, and 
that upon occasion this trace, being stimulated in some 
other way, may revive or renew the former process in a 
somewha t faint er degree. The connection between the 
'inadequate' stimulus and the revived neural process 
would con s titute the physiological exp l anation of success-
• 
• 
1 
1 ve association". 
- 58 -
The Position of the associ ntionists might 
be summed up as follows. Mind is a vast number of 
elementary impressions bound by a proce ss of association, 
based on chemical combination s. These impressions are 
dependent on physiological processes of the nervous 
system, the nature of which is problematic. Elementary 
impres s ions are of two kinds, sensat ional and ideational. 
The distinction between these is based on the type of 
the corresponding neural process, whether the stimulus 
is from the brain centre or from a sense organ. An 
association process includes t wo acts.,. uniting mental 
processes into sequences and into groups. Association 
proceeds according to two laws - gualitative, depending 
on similarity and contiguity, and quantitative, depending 
on intensity, frequenc y , recency, duration, hedonic 
accompaniments and heredity. 
The steps of the growth of a hi gher mental 
process is very simple. A union of simultaneous sensations 
occurs and a perception is the result. Unite p erceptions 
or perceptions and other sensations, and imagery is pro-
duced. Ideas arise through association of sensations, 
perceptions and images. These are all symbols of objects 
of experience. Thro ugh repetition and the association 
1. A History of Association Psychology, p. 273 
• 
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the verbal element aris~ •. Concepts are built up and 
judgments are form ed. 'Whole trains of thought arise 
according to the laws of successive association. The 
a.ffe ctiv r:=: and conative con sciousnesses are similarly 
explB.in~d. It is all a simple psycho-physical process. 
B. Behaviorism. 
Since professor Watson has been hailed as the 
1 
enfant terrible of this new branch of nnature.l science", 
we may start our discussion w1 th his own statement of 
this view. "Psychology is that division of natural 
science which takes human activity and conduct as its 
subject matter", 2 or, "Psych ology is a division of 
science which deals -,with the functions underlieing 
human activity s.nd cond ;.wt". 3 Its problem is to "formu-
late throu@l systemrat ic observation and experimentation 
the laws and principles which underlie man's reaction s". 4 
Such a study should result in t wo generalizations: 
( 1) "To predict human activity with reas onable certainty" 
ana (2) the "formulation of laws and principles whereby 
man's actions can be controlled by organized society'. 5 
-
The task of psychology as a science 1 s "unraveling the 
complex factors involved in the development of human 
behavior from infancy to old age, and of finding the laws 
1. Roback, Behaviorism and Psvchology, p. 87 
2. Psychology fro m the Stapdpoint of a Behavior i st, p. 1 
3. Ps~h. Rev., 24 (1917), 329 
4. Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behay iorist, p. 1 
5. Ibid~, p. 1, 2. 
• 
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1 for the regulation of behavior". So the behaviorist 
proceeds up on the bas ic hypothesis t hat every act or 
response is p receded by a stimulus or s i t .1at ion whi ch 
called it forth, and if that be true, the go al of 
p sycholog y is to study that we may be able to "ascertain 
such data and laws that, g iven the stimulus, psychology 
can predict what the response will be; or, on the other 
ham, giv:en the response, it can specify the nature of 
2 
the effective stimulus". We study man for his "reaction 
possibilities". Professor Watson claims the prestige 
of his tory for his doctrine, sU:n.owing that the control 
of behavior -was the fi ,rst interest of mankind, for by the 
khowled~e of the control of behavior the serpent succeeded 
i n temp ting Eve, and Eve, i n her knowled .':~e of the subject, 
likewise succeeded in temp ting Adam.3 
Behaviorism as a psycholo~ical theory made its 
fi r st real impression in 1913 with the publication of a 
couple of articles by Professor Watson, and a little later 
the publication of h is Behaviorism. The theory developed 
fro m a radical functionalis m like t hat of Pillsbury and 
MacDougall, which gave rise to a feelir~ on the part of 
Watson, Holt, Weiss and others that func t ionalism f a iled 
1. lbid' p. 8 
2 • . Ibid, p. 10 
3. Psych. Rev., 24 (1917), 330 
• 
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to indicate adequa tely the manner in which a conscious 
process could be rega rded as controlling behavior. Many 
were denying the causal power of cons ci O'J.sness, and so 
the que stion inevitably arose, "how may the behavior 
of man for animals) be described as solely due to the 
receptor-effector processes in the neuro-muscular 
1 
systems? The functionalists had accepted consciousness 
as a f ·.mction in behavior as a self-evident fact needing 
no ft~ther proof, and the behaviorists were not content. 
So consciousness was bro ught to tri s.l, conv icted as an 
impost er and doomed to hard labor ~. s a mere reaction. 
"Whatever the metaphysical principles involved •... conscious-
ness, as a scientific concept, may be reearded as merely 
a supplementary reaction of a specific type to a g iven 
situatiorl'. 2 To quote the same writer again, "Perhaps 
the distinguishin g difference between the functionalEt 
and the behaviorist lies in the fact that the behaviorist 
disregards the entity which the functionalist calls 
conscious~ess. He regards the neuro-muscular system as 
the means by which the organism adjusts itself to its 
environir.ent, just as the heart, the lungs, the digestive 
track, are means to keep the organism a1ive .•• The real 
object of worth for the behavi J rist is not the thrilly, 
fascinating, esoteric, p seudo-problem of the mystic, but 
1. Weiss, A. P., Psych. Rev., 24 (1917), 354 
2. Weiss, Psvch. Rev., 24 (1917), 362 
• 
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the permanent, measured and describable adjustment s 
of the race". 1 "Consciousness is a process in exactly 
... 
the same sense that osmosis or alimentation is a pro-
cess11.2 Professor Weiss gives f0 '-1!' principles ·which 
he thinks are accepted by behaviorists, and from which 
he makes four ded~.lction~! . These are: (1) Consciouness 
(the t ot ality of sensat ions, i mage s and affections) i s 
a purely personal experi ence and has no scientific 
value unless expressed in t erms of be havior. (2) Many 
forms o f behavior are not accompanied by consciousness. 
(3) The consc iou s acco mpaniments of behavior vary be-
tween observers. (4) Complex mental processes are more 
than the mental states into which they can be analyzed. 
The y have a social reference 1fuich i n trospection cannot 
reveal. His deduc t ions are (1) If cons ciousness must 
be e xperienced in behavior, then consciousness is a study 
of behavior. (2) If many f orms of behavior are_ not 
accompanied by consciousness, consciousness is not a 
function of behavior. ( 3) If accompanying consciousness 
can vary with the observers, then consciousness is either 
an independent variable of behavior or a dependent 
variable of a highly complex formula, and in neither case 
is a better measure of behavior than behavior itself and 
so is superfluous in t he study of behavior. (4) If com-
plex mental processes are more than elementary mental 
1. Ibid , p. 367, 368. 
2. Frost, Psych. Rev., 19 (1912), 248 
3. Psych. Rev., 24 (l917), 305. 
• 
• 
- 63 -
states, then the analysis of consciousness does not 
predict behavior. 
So the 'BUbject matter of psychology is not 
con sci ou sne ss, but behavior, and exp eriment and observation 
are its only methods. Int rospection is not to be tolerated. 
It is merely a "group of speech reactions which conform 
1 to a particular terminolo&". Yet, if in ex-' iment-
ing, the observer is not tru{ir~ into account the intro-
spective evidence given by the subject, are we not 
justified in inferring that he has smuggled in his own 
introspe ction in the interpretation of his data? If we 
are no t permitted to interpret behavior i n the light o f 
our ovm exp erience, of what impor t will be our observations? 
Professor Pillsbury is prompted to remark that "Watson 
from introspection •.• insists that cons ci o usne ss has no 
existence in man or animals"~ which moves Roback to 
cl? ssify Watso n with the brilliant individual who 
dreamed that he was awake, which gave him such a shock 
that he woke u p very briskly only to find himself sound 
asleep~ 
In an elementary sense, then, behavior means 
a ser e s of activities or processes. This group of pvo-
cesses is the unit for observation, and behavior cann::t 
be restricted to any class of objects. It is an observa1ble 
1. Weiss, Psych. Rev., 24 (1917), 365 
2. Essentials of Psychology, p. 65 
3. Behaviorism and Psychology, p. 87 
• 
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group of changes. May we not then speak of the be-
havior of a piece of rubber, a come t or an electron 
as well as of an organism? This raises the question for 
Roback, 11Seeing then that the denotation of behavior is 
of such wide sco pe, wh&.t prevents us ex hypothesi from 
incluimg aJ.l the various changes in matter under the 
1 
general scheme of psych olog y?" So Hollingworth modi-
fies the definition of psychology to "the science of 
t he behavior of statistically variable experience 11 • 2 
The one word tha t really reveals the nature of the science 
is experience, a subj e ctive th ing out of the re P.lm of 
behavior. (Or does experience behave?). 
But granted that behavior refers to org ani sms, 
what is an instance of b ehavior? Various answers wi 11 
be given by t he behaviorists, s o we may accep t the most 
simple and most generally offered concep tion that an 
instance of behavior is any reaction to stimulus of a 
muscle or a gland. These reactions or responses are of 
four kind s. (1) Exp lic i t respo~se, such as talki ng , un-
locking a door or playing tennis. (2) I mp l i cit habit 
responses, thinki ng (sub-vocal talkin g), and general body 
habi t s. (3) Explicit h ereditary responses, i.e., emotional 
reactions, as sneez ing, love or fear, (4) Implicit heredi -
tary respoi'..ses, ductless gland secret ions , circulation, 
etc. 
1. Beha viorism and Psychology, p . 75 
2. Journal. Phil., 13 (19~1), 187. 
• 
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A. R. Weiss gives four poin t s as the basis 
f or behaviorisrl. (1) The resistance of the neurones. 
This varies with the function. (2) Every receptor is 
directly connected by a neural chain with a restricted 
effector system and tr...rouejl varyin g degress of indirect-
ness to many other effector systems. (3) One nervous 
process modifies the charac t er of other nervous pro-
cesses -o-ccurring with i t . ( 4) Certain configurations 
of neural connections between receptors and effectors 
are inherited, other are acquired. 
With such a simple foundation it is not strange 
that the char:o of behaviorism sh ould lie in the e ase with 
which it may exp l a in or dispense with any question at will, 
as for instance meaning or memory. "The ques tion of mean-
ing is an abstraction, a rationalization and a specula-
tion serving no pul~ose ••• From the bystander's or be-
haviorist~ point of view the p roblem never arises. We 
watch what the animal or the human beine; is doing. He 
means what he does ••• His action is the meaning. Hence 
exhaust the co ncept action and we have e xhausted the 
concept of meanlr..g. It is a waste of effort to raise 
problems of me anir..g apar t from actions which are actually 
observed". 2 Memory is defined as "a general term to 
express t he fact that after a period of no practice in 
1. Psych. Rev., 24 (1917), 315. 
2. Watson, ~rit~ Jour. Psych., 11 (1920), 103 
... 
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certain habits ••• the function is not los t but is retained 
as a part of the individual or e:.a nism, al thou@ i t may, 
through disus e have suffered a greater or less impair-
1 
ment 11 • 
W. H. She ldcn answers this. "Now ther e can be 
nothing in the nature o f present behavior - be it of 
whatever s ort - to indi cate that its ob je ct is p2.st. That 
the or ganism reacts in a certain way, however complicated, 
is a present fact, and conts.ins nothing about it whic~ 
sug gest s that the object to which it adjus ts itself was, 
and no long er is, real. "-"he organism's action thus fails 
to give an account of the full significance of the know-
ledge of past events 11 • 2 
An emotion is "an hereditary pattern-reaction 
inv olving profound change e of bod ily mechanism as a whole, 
but p articularly of the viscera l or glandular sys temu. 3 
G. De Laguna says that we know t ha t we are angry, for 
instance, because we catch the echo of our rRised voice 
or become aware of our own menaci ng attitude. 4 May I 
not as well say that I know that a lemon is sour because 
I make a face? Am so the behaviorist continues with. his 
simple explanations, the time· sense is explained on the 
basis o.f an organic refl ex, and hallucinations are ac:}ounted 
1. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a 
Behaviorist, p. 304. 
2. Strife of Sys tern§ and Productive Duality, p. 212 
3. Watson, Brit. Jour. Psych., 11 (1920), 195 
4. Jour. Phil., 15 (1918), 621 
• 
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for in the same way as optical allusions, by an over-
1 
active retina. Or again ask a behaviorist what the 
underlieing principle of unity is in the mind, and he 
will tell you that "th~uni ty of the mind is what might 
2 
be called an overtone of organic inte€$ration". 
Professor Singer, in a recent book, (Mind as 
Beh avior) attributes to himself the honor (?) of firS:. 
advocating the theory that mini may be interpreted in 
. 3 
terms of behavior. He goes on to decry the fact that 
others have since take n up the proposition and have 
evolved from it the conce . tion ::> f behaviorism as now 
generally acce~ted, and makes us ~~ink that he is going 
to give us a behavioristic theory that will nermit a 
mind, and even accepts as in good repute that ostracized 
word, consciousness. But we are n ot to be thus encouraged 
for many pages. He clearly states his difference with 
behaviorists when, in speaking of behavior, he says 
"vm ich other call the criterion of mirrl and which I c a ll 
mind". 4 He bri ng s his point out further in his ana:bgy 
of the science of he at. As we first thought of a hot body 
as a body plus heat, and. then learned that "Heat is not 
something inferred fr om the heated behavior of a body; 
it · is that behavior", 5 so "Con sci ou.sne ss is not someth i ng 
1. Watson, ~sych~~~y from the StandQoint of a Behaviorist, 
p. I'll . 
2. Keiser, 0. L., P sych. Rev., 35 (1924), 556. 
3. Preface, p. VI 
4. Preface, p. 49 
5. Preface, p. 15. 
• 
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inferred fr om behavior; it is behavior. Or, more accurate-
ly: Our belief in consciousness is an exp e ctation of 
probable behavior based on an observation of actual 
behavior, a belief to be con fir med or refuted by more 
observation as any other belief in a fact is to be tried 
1 
out". Life, the mystery of the ages, he as easily ex-
plains. "L1f e is no longer to be inferred from behavior; 
it l§_ behavior. " 2 Have we not come to the point of 
- 3 real~ ? ing the meaning lessness of the mystery?" The 
important thins the other behaviorists hav e omitted, 
thinks Professor Singer, is rrurnose. All behavior must 
be interpreted teleologically. But what do es he mean by 
purpose? Simply "the averag e common result of a type 
of act."4 The science of life then is "the science of 
c:: 
the p robable in the domain of self-preservative behavior"~ 
A self preservative being is one who "so act s t.hat the 
repetition of his act is seen to be a means of answerine 
6 its recurrence". He summarizes his position, and gives 
us his final conclusion as to mind when he says that 
where 11 di fferences between higher and lower life exists 
it is possible to introduce a new category to describe 
their relations. This new cate3ory is ind. 117 Poor 
Mowgli . i s still without a soul: 
1. Preface, p. 10-11 
2. Preface, p• 16 
3. Preface,pp. 17. 
4. Preface, p. 67 
s. Preface, p. 69 
6. Preface, p. 71 
7. Preface, p. 74. 
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There are enou gh var:1fties of behaviorism to please 
the tastes of all, ranging from the mildness of Professor 
MacDougall and the uncertainty of Pillsbury, throu gh the 
"unstable state of equilibrium" of Kantor, to Watson's Be-
havior and the f ancifu. l the ories in Profe s sor Givler's 
Ethics of Hercules. Together they have discarded sensations, 
perceptions, imagGs, attention and will. Consciousness has 
gon e the way of the soul and self ani introspection are but 
" p seudo-problems" for the mystic. Instead, we have, however, 
a super-abundance of stimuli receptors, and effectors, be-
havi or segments, respon se pat terns and adjustments. From 
the s e we may learn much of behavior. We know that various 
physical stimuli fall on the sense organs. Some of these 
issue in Muscular or glandular activiti es, and sometimes we 
may even trace the neural pathway involved. These activities 
bring about changes in the physical world. Sometimes muscular 
a ctl vi t y may rise w1 th no apparent sensor y stimulus. Prev ious 
behavior may modify present or future behavior. From this we 
conclude tba t in some way or other the orga n ism is able to 
store up experi e nces which later make vari ations possible in 
r eaction and response, and Which defy active prediction. But 
of what happens between the ti me the stimulus is g iven and the 
r eaction occurs we may not know unless the indivic ual tells 
us ~hat h~ s passed i n h i s mind during the interval, and to do 
that would inv ·J lve introspection, and yet introsp ection is only 
a " group of speech reactions". Surely there is much yet to be 
desired. The play is on but "Hamlet has been omitted from the 
plot". 
• 
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C. Self-Psychology. 
The self-psychologist would define psychology 
as the "science of conscioqs selves", 1 "the science of 
self in relation to en vir on me nt 11 • 2 "Psycholog y deals 
3· 
wi t h facts as events i n our conscious life." To do this, 
Miss Calkins, the leading exponent of this theory, points 
4 
out that neither the structuralistic nor the functionalistic 
approach i s capable of meetin g all of the problems alone. 
The structuralist studies, not the self or consciousness, 
but the c ontent of co nsciousness, sensations, percep ts, 
a nd more complex states. He is concerned not with the 
ac t ine , perceivi ng self, but with consciousness as ab-
stract and unrelated to any self. This, Miss Calkins 
thi ks, may be both consistent and scientific, but it 
necessarily ne glects a part of immediate consciousness.5 
It is impossible to be conscious of an abstract idea-
1t must be .my idea- an idea of or belong ing to myself. 
In its structural analysis am c1assification it cannot 
describe the different forms of experience. The same 
argW!lent is true of the functionalistic point of view. 
We may study functions, but can we study them apart 
from the self that f unctions? So, recognizing the value 
of both of the ::: e methods of approE~ch, Miss Calkins 
1. Calkins, Phil. Rev., 9 0 .. 900), 491 
2. Calkins, ~st Book }~ Psychology, p. 273 
3. Stricklan:i, Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 24 
4, Calkins, A First Book in Psycholo8_y, p. 273 
5. Ibid. 
• 
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prefers to describe psycholog y as the science of conscious 
selve s with their referen ce to feelin~: s, and other se l ves, 
different kinds of selves, and the rela tion between 
1 
s elve s, or, the activities o f the self. 
Innnediate l y the self-psycholog ist is faced wi th 
the cr i ticism th a t the self, or selves, is not a subject 
f or science, but a philosophical or metaphysical study. 
Miss Calkins answers the challenge and shows that self 
2 has a pla ce in the sciences. Science is an investigation 
of facts, of phen omena, while philosophy is an attemp t to 
int e r pret the facts, an att empt to study the "self-dep e ndent 
whole of realit y ". A fact i s "one-of-many", an alway s 
depende nt bit of r ealit y . Qualities, things , movements 
am events are admit ted as facts. A careful i nvesti gation 
will show that s elv e s may tre ate d as facts for science. 
This merely implie s t ha t they be tak en f or grru1t e d and 
critic a lly observ ed and classifi ed on the b a s is o f the i r 
relation to each other and to the facts of every other 
order. If selve s are a n obvious category in everyday 
e xp:erience, we may have a science of selves, f or every 
obj ect o f observation is an object of science. "::But", 
the opponent of th i s view will argue, nthe self canno t 
b e a direct obj e ct for scient i f i c observati on, the self 
can be observe d only by introspection, and introsp ection 
1. Calkins , Phil. Rev. 9 (1900), 491 
2. Ibid. p. '4§2. 
•• 
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is both unscientific am unreliable!'. But each science, 
in addition to description (analysis and classification) 
and explanat ion has its own peculiar method of procedure • 
The facts of p aychology , or psychic facts, differ fr om 
physical phenomena and must be observe d by the method 
peculiar to psychology, introspection, a leg itimate, 
scientific method. It is observation, observation of 
the self, observation as truly as is the observation of 
any physical phenomena. In the words of Professor 
Strickland, "It would look as though the ·s ubject who has 
the eXp f·; rience would have t o be depended upon for the most 
important facts •••• But after letting the subject of the 
experi en ce furnish the facts, shall we turn over the 
in terpr eta tion of the facts to the observing bystander? 
Yfuen the interpretation means psychological description 
this will gene rally have to b e do ne sil1:! e the observer 
is usually the one who has the technical knoVTledge and 
trainin g necessary to make the description accurate and 
to bring it within the a pproved formulations of the science. 
But if the interpretation is to refer primarily to the 
meaning of the experi ence and its value for the one who 
has it, then the observer may not be competent. Surely, 
for a person to in t erpret in terms of meaning an experience 
which he had never himself had would be a procedure o f 
doubtful value at best·" 1 "The character of the ma terial 
1. Psycholor;v of Religious Experience, p. 17,18 
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in any g iven fie lcl. of investigation should be a prime 
factor in determining the method to be used in that 
field not traditional ready-made methods passed over 
1 f rom another field." But, of course, introspection 
must be supplemented by the other methods common to 
all s cie nee, de script ion and explanation, and e xperi-
mentation. 
Miss Calkins further points out tha t "it is 
significant that the relation to oneself to other selves 
preceees the distinction between self an:l other facts, 
either psychic or physical. In other words, the dis-
tine ti on of conscious co ntent, of physical and of 
physical thing s fro m OiL Self, are less si mp l e and less 
primitive th an the c ontrast between oneself and one's 
2 
fellow" Again, a distinction between physical thing s 
and p sychic content must be carefully drawn. Physical 
facts are common to all selves, that is, we constantly 
assume that the physical fact 'Which we perceive may be 
shared, or similarly perceived, by other selves . The 
psychic fact is private, it cannot be shared. The physical 
fact is dependent of any particular individual. Psychic and 
physical events and physical things are, however, subor-
d inate t o the self, they are "facts-for-a-self". Science 
is the study of fundamental fact s . Psycholog y, as the 
scienc e of selves, is the study of fundamental facts, 
1. !bid , p. 18 
2. Phil. Rev., 9 (1900), 493 
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1 
..§.el ve_§, and conscious con tent , facts- for-the- self. 
With the self established in its rightful 
place in science, we may raise the que s tion as to the 
nc:t ture of this imperious self. Ne gatively, the self 
is not the soul of mediaeval philosophy . The psycholo-
gist, as such, is not interested in the quest ions oon-
cerning the ~.e taphysical aspects of the self . It is 
not the psycho-physical organism , for that is a biolog ical 
rather than a psychological fact . I t is n ot the sociol-
ogist's self for the sociological unit is the system 
of related selve s. Miss Calkins says the self is sui 
generis and incapable of definition. 2 But certain funda-
mental charac te ristics may be given. FL'st, wherever 
th e re is consc i ousness, there is experie need self-con-
sci ou sne ss, althou gh not necessarily reflective . In 
other words it is the sense of .:t_ogetherne ss, the aware-
ness of experiences as belongin g togeth er in one personal 
stream. There could be no such thirl8 as content of c on-
sciousne s s apart from the conscious stream of the self, 
an:1 integral part of experience. There is, in every reference 
to consciousress, an awareness of meaning , a ref erence t o· 
somethi ng beyond itself. Consciousness is relatively 
persistent. \Vhile chant;ing, growir~, developing, I am, 
nevertheless, the same person, in the sense of identity, 
at least, as I was y es terday or ten years ago. Consciousness 
i s · time transcendi ng , makine; possible this identity after 
• 
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lapses of consciousness, am in its ability to graJ3p the 
succession or sequence of events. It is space trans-
cending in thEtt it cannot be located in space, yet 
though spiritual or psychic, it interacts Ytith matter. 
I t is free, in the sense thPt certai n f orms of c onsciousne ss 
are within limits able to choose f o r themselves their 
own e nds in spite of physical or external influences. 
Consciousness is a development, a pro cess of g rowing and 
increasing concepts. This self is a complex, feeling, 
willing , remembo' ring , involving oth er activities, simple 
and co mplex. It is unique, individtal and private, 
resembling other selve s in so me respects, y e t belonging 
to no one el ee and never shared. It is fundamental or 
basic to all exp eriences. "Self means the conscious 
s ubj e ct of ex:oerience". 1 All functions, processes and 
states must belong to a self. The self is rela_ted to its 
environment, perso nal and imperso nal, physica l and social. 
The self is at the same time both analyzable into elements 
ard a complex of social and physical relation s to environ-
ment. It relat e s all experience into a system&. tic whole. 
Granted the scientifi c position of the self and 
g iven a description of the self, ho·w are the psychic facts 
to b e tre ated in rela tion to the self? A psychic fac t 
may be treated as a co mpl ex of elements, as mere ly •content 
l. Strick land, Psvchol o?;v of' Religio'-.l.s Experienc e , p . 35 
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or states of consciousness, ab s tract from the self for 
whor.1 they are a fact. Or they may be treat ed as experiences 
of selve s, and we would then speak no longer o f percepts, 
emo tions, and volitions, but of perception, emotion, and 
1 
will. Perception then would be the " consciousness of 
shari r.g the experience with a number of other selves. 
~he more we observe ourselves perceiving the mor e we dis-
cover the consciousness of other people who may do or see 
or hear what we do or say or hear". 2 It would be impossib le 
to study percept ion adequately apart from the pel"ceivine; 
self, for i</nile perceiving, I am conscious of myself 
as b e ing receptiv e. The distinction between imae ination 
am perception is this consciou sness that you may share 
the perception. (Not th ;:.;_ t my perception may be in any 
way yours, but that the re is a cons ciou sne ss that you may 
ha. ve a similar perception produced by the same or similar 
stimulus.) 
"Emotion is the consciousness of one self in 
passive relations with o t hers. n 3 The distin ction between 
sensation and affection is that sensations are related 
to other selves, while affections rrre :1ot. Will and 
faith are bo t h contents .::::> f consciousness, but are bot~-; 
utterly meaningle ss apart from the self. ~hese are the 
active, asser tive e xpe riences of the self. In perceiving 
1. Miss Ca lins, Phil. Rev., 9 (1900), 498 
2. Ibid, P. 499 
3. J.bid, p. 499 
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I may not choose my objects, and imac;inc:ction is not 
altogether um er con t rol. "Will is the con sci ou sne s s 
of mv active connec tion with other selve s or with other 
,} 
1 
things, and e goistic, imp erious relation .•• 11 In will 
I am actively, assertively related to my environment. 
Will makes s elf say: 
11 I am master of my fate, 
I am captain of my soul." 
Faith, th oue;h assertive is no t the demanding phase of 
cons ciousness, b ut an attitude in which I will to subordi-
nate mysel f, and is primarilJr a relation to other selve s. 
I have faith in my brother, my fr i end on in Goo. Faith 
a~d will are both s ocial attitudes, i. e., they i nvolve 
pe rsons, selves, and their relations. 
These few illustrations will suffice to sho'H 
that psychic f a cts, "facts- for- consc iousness", cannot 
be studied apart from the self, for they are gn inte gral 
part of experience, the sum-total of whi ch i s consciousness . 
1. Miss Calkin, First Book, p. 226. 
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IV. Implications of these Theories 
for the Phi los oo!.!Y__Qf Rel igi . .:::.o.::.::n:..:..•--
Having considered some of the vari ou.s theories 
of cons<i ousness, we may now C8nsider so me of their 
implications. Each claims to be sci entific, arid after 
all, what diifference do e s it make ho·w we approach or 
interpret the problem? What vi tal d1 fference will it 
make if I regard consciousness as a bundle of impressions, 
as the behavior of a biolog cal org;:mism, or as an active 
self to wh ich these impression s belong, and which expresses 
itself in modes of behavior? Will it make any particular 
difference in my attitude toward the higher thing s of 
life if I reduce cons ciousness to sense i mpr e ssions or 
to behavior segments, or re§ard it as the whole of the 
stream of experience? 
A. Implications of As~ociationism. 
For the consideration of the first of these 
we probably can do no better than begin with the Hum.ean 
position, that mind is a series of perceptions. "'What 
we call mind is nothing but a heap or co lle cti on of 
d ifferent perceptions, u n ite d together by certain re-
lation s, and su pposed, thou gh falsely, to be endowed with 
l 
a perfect simplicity or identity ." "Since nothin._~ is 
ever present to the mind b u t pe rceptions, and since all 
ideas are derived fr om s orne 't.h ing antecedently present 
1. Huxley, Hume, p. 63 
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to the mini, it f o llows tha t it is impossible for us 
to as much as conceive or form an idea of anything 
specificall~r differen t fr om ideas and impressions. Let 
us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; 
let us chase our imagin r-J.tion to the h eavens, or to the 
utmost limits of the univ erse; we never really advance 
a step beyond ourselves, nor can we conceive any kind 
of exis ten ce, but tho se "Jerceptions which have appe a red 
in that narrow c ompass. This is the universe of the 
imagination, n or be.ve we any ideas but wh .s. t are there 
1 p roduced." 
All our ideas come fr om impre ssions. The idea 
o f the self can rise from no impression, and s o the idea 
cannot b e ultimate. "There are so me philosophers who 
ima §jine that we are every moment intimately consci ous _, of 
wha. t we call our self; that we feel its existen ce and 
its continuance in existence; and are certain , beyond 
the evidence of demonstration, b o th of its perfect 
identit y and its simplicity .•.. Vfuen I enter most intimate-
ly into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold , light 
or shade, love or h a tred, pain or ple a sure. I ne ver can 
catch !!!Y.Self at any time without a perce p ti on and never 
can observe anything but the p erception . When my per-
ceptions are rem oved for any t ime, or b y sound sleep , 
1. Hume, A Treatise of Human Na.ture, Everyman's Lib . Ed ., 1,72. 
• 
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so long am I insensible of ~s~lf, am may be truly 
saiD. not to exist. And were all my percept ions removed 
by death, and I could neither think, nor feel, nor see, 
nor love, nor hf! .. te, after the dissolution of my body, 
I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what 
1 is farther requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. 11 
The final result of his reasonin g is that as v;e use 
the name body to denote the sum of the phenomena which 
made up our physical existence, so we employ the word 
soul to denote the sum of the phenomena of our mental 
existence, and we have no right to suppose that there 
is anythirg beyond these phenomena. The idea of the SOJ.ll 
is a figment of the imagination, and we can know nothing· 
about it; and if Philo correctly describes the conclusion 
to which Hume arrives, "that it affords no inference that 
effe cts human li f e, or can be the SC :) ur ce of any act or 
forbearance", we may vrel l turn prag.'latist and ask whether 
a proposition which has no practical c Jnsequences is to 
be regarded a t all in seeking the trut~. 2 
If Hume is right in reducing all experience to 
sense perceptions, to externEllly stimulated sensations, 
then surely he is right in denying the existence of the 
self after the dissolution of perception by death. W ith 
the exit of the self must go the higher values, for in-
1. Ibid, pp. 238-239 
2. See Pringle-Pattison , The I dea of God, p. 23 
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trinsic values are depe ndent on persons for their c on-
servation. Religi ous knowledge, be it faith or reason , 
is always value knowledge. It incltiles beli ef about 
ob je ctiv e reality, and r eality, we have noted, to the 
consistent associati onist, mus t be co extens i ve with 
1d eas. The a ssertion of this k nowledge is never a mere 
descrip tion o f sense pe r c e ption, and ye t the empiricist 
would have to c on fine it to such. Every piece of re -
li gious knowledge incl udes s omethi ng beyond that wh i ch 
is of rre rely a sensuous nature. Always some assertion 
of value is made. We say "God is good", not simply t h at 
"God is 11 • All religious knowledge incl ude s reference to 
v a lue, to e x istence and to personality. Radi Cc"'. l emp iri cal 
psychology would le ave n o ro om for these fundamental 
references. We believe that relig i on pre supposes belief 
in the c onservation of value. Value depends on personality. 
Then it wou l d f o llow that relig ion de ~) ends up on t h e con -
1 
servati on of persons. Yet, when sense p erception s are 
removed b y death , the self becomes a corrlf) l e te nonent ity. 
Thus with the co -ces s ation of value and con sc i ousness, 
must go all c on cept i on of immorta lity. Hume eve n though t 
that upon emp irical grounds the moral argument for 
immortality mus t go. Our sole me a ns of k nowing i s the 
reasoning fac ult y tha t God h c~ S g iv en us. Our coneeption 
of the j ust ice cL Go:lis only the iSame .attribute t hat we call 
justice in ourselves. If God is responsible f or our 
1. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 340 
• 
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knowledge, we cannot, acc ord i ng t o our concep tion of 
jus tice, ima gi n e Him rewarding or punishing oth ers f or 
His ovvn deed s. "If any purpo s e of na.t1.lre be clear, we 
may affirm that the whole scope of the intent i on of 
man's creation, so far as we may j udge by natural reason, 
is limited to the present life. 111 
Belief in God as the creative, intellig en t a nd 
rational vmr ld principle, Humea n thought as easily dis-
poses of. The ne.cessi ty of the causal r elation lay at 
the bc..se of Berkeley's advan c e from the exi stence of ideas 
to his conception of the world as a universal and a 
ration al sys tem dependent up on God. In the nfree 
activity o f the spirit" he found basis f o r the reality 
of causati on. But Hume struck at tr.e ro o ts vrhen he 
reduced the law of ca.us e and eff'ect t o a product of 
finite mind. He held that the i dea of c ause and effect 
cru1d n o t be account ed f or in any qualities in the objects 
consi dered, but mus t be fo und in the r elation between 
the objects. These relations are contiguity and succession, 
plu s a th :ir d and more important relation , necessary 
co nne ction . But thl s necessary connec tion depend s merely 
upon inference, or. upon c u stom. The mind has been accustomed 
to ass oclE;te on e with t he other, h eat and flame, wa ter 
arrl refreshment. The min d is determined tm~ ou gh cu stom 
t o i nfer a necessa ry conne c tion between ob j ects. Thus 
l. Huxley, Hume, p. 176 
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the inference is an affail' of the imagination, the 
result of the custom of contiguity or succession. 
Here the problem of belief enters in, and Hu.me disposes 
of this by say i n g tr.!8.t the only differen ce between an 
idea that we b elieve and a mere fancy is the superior 
1 force of the belief. The ultimate c me l tlS ion then is 
that which we call power, or causal efficiency, exists 
only in the mind. "The efficacy of causes li e in the 
2 
determination of the m:nd". Then, if this be right, 
Ged as the First Cause, or creative p~v er, must also 
be a figment of the imagin ation. Su ch a radic al 
empiricism would deny that the universe can be shown to 
be a rational vvhole . The character of experience 
( sensations and impressions) does not justify s u ch a 
view. Any conception of order can be regarded as n o more 
than a working hypothesis, and liable to be sup erseded 
at any time. Therefore we cannot reasonably conceive 
of the universe as an intelligible whole. Our teleological 
arguments for th e existence of God would also have to fall 
in the light of this, if it be c orrect. 
Empirical psycholog y further rests upon the 
assumption that experience presents us with a mass of 
facts, the relation of which we may partially discover, 
and yet from which we have no right to infer that the 
1. Treatise of Human Nature. Everyman's Lib. p . 101. 
2. Ibid, p. 163 
• 
• 
- 84 -
whole world is intelligible. Yet when I expr ess the 
simp lest everyday exp erience, I mean that a like experience 
is possible for eve r y other person under like circumstances, 
and thus presuppose the in tel lie; 1 bill ty th a t empiricism 
denies. Thus it seems that such a theory assumes, under 
~rticu~. r facts, the unity and intellig ibility of the 
universe and then denies it j ust be cause it has been 
assumed. 
Other implications of the associa tionist's 
theories mig ht be drawn, but from the s e we may see tha t 
the strict lirni tation to sense experience would leave 
little ro om for religion. This v ry limitation leads 
J ame s to see in "my stical states" windows · through which 
the mini looks upon a more extens i ve and inclusive world. 
Such coJmceptions leave no room for a relig ion interested 
in personality, 1 ts reality and permanence, and vm ich 
fin ds the ree.l world of abiding values in person ality 
and its preserv a.tion. Th i s theory carried into theology 
is a s p ecu l a tive attem~t, thinks Dr. Knudson, to bring 
philosophy and theolog y into harmony with empirical 
. -. 
science. In a ttempting this traditional empiricism 
eliminates theolog y, reduces philosophy to e. theory 
of thought and knowledg e, and make s science and experience 
1 
lo c i cally impo s sible. If tha t be true, there is no 
room f or religiou s experience. 
1. Knudson, Present Tenden cies 1n Reli p:_ious Thougftt 
pp. 177-178 
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It is a sig nificant thing that the adherents 
of this theory are the msel ve s aware o f the labyrint h 
into which they have wandered. After followi n g Hume 
thr ougp the maze of arguments, we co me to t he en d of 
the Treatise of Human Na ture only to find ourselves 
well launched into sk epticism, with the dangers o f 
s olip sism staring us in the f ace. "But u p on a more strict 
review of the section concerning person al ide ntity, I 
find myself i n \0 lve d in such a labyrinth that, I must 
confess, I neither know how to correc t my opinions, n or 
h ow to render them con sis tent .•. All my hopes v a nish whe n 
I co me t o exp l a in the principle th.?.t unites our successiv e 
pe rcep tions in our thought and c ons ci ou ness •... For my 
part, I mu s t plead to the p r ivilege of a skep t ic, and I 
1 
confe s s tha t this difficul ty is too h a rd f or my understanding . " 
B. lr.!!J2.lic a ti ons of Behaviorism. 
Le t us a gain, a t l e ast f .or the s a i<: e of the 
argument, become thorough going be h aviorist s , and agree 
with Professor We t so n tha t "Psychology is t f1..a t division 
of rut t ural s cience whi ch tak e s human activity and c onduct 
. 2 
a s its sub ~ ect ma tter 11 • To 1::egi n with, consciousness 
can b e nothing other than a supplementary r eaction of a 
1. Treatise on Human Nature, Everyman's Lib., p. 319 
2. Y sycholo~y f r om the Standpoin t of a Behaviori s t ,p. 1. 
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sp e cific type to a g i've n stimulus. Vlh&.t effect must 
this co nc e ~)tion of consciou sness, if carr led to its 
logical conclusion s , have up o n our relig ious thinking? 
While denying to be philosophical, such a view must 
ns verthel P. ss have an underlieing basis of thought. 
Profe s s or A. p. Weiss, a leading b ehaviorist, points 
out that while physiological psycholog y is dualistic, 
b2 hav1or psychology must be based on monistic principles. 
"For the behaviori s t the mental seri es is re garded only 
1 
as another neural series." The basic principles a re not 
only monistic, but naturalistic. Behav i orism finds its 
allie s among the pragmatist E and the neo - realists. It 
go e s back to Hobbes ru1d reduces all to matter and motion. 
If God exist at all, God and nature are merely 
different name s for reality, and we are driven to a 
pantheistic view. Pantheism leaves an alternative between 
a spiritualistic and a naturalistic interpretation of this 
unity, and behaviorism is f orced to take the naturalistic 
stand. On first thought, sinc e all is one, such a system 
might seem at l e ast to have the merit of h armony and unity. 
But on sec ond thought, discord must exist within the 
harmony. Yet it is argued tha t each individual has its 
appoint ed place, and should see1t its good i n union wi'th 
the ·whole. Then ther e would 1:e varying degrees of r ea lity, 
and to disturb the harmony of the whole by striving to 
1. Jour_. Phil., 16 ( 1919) , 627 
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reach a higper degr e e of r eality wo uld be immoral. 
Aga i n, we would have to face the q J.estion how the Absolute 
One can manifest itself in the f1 ni te r:~.a ny? Or is th e 
Absolute finite'? One must distinguish be t ween the 
various phases or modes of the One. This is attempted 
by measuring the degrees of freedom fro m self-contra-
diction, dete rmining which modes most nearly approach 
pe r fect consistency. The Absolute alone is completely 
free from contradiction, is the h ypothesis. Yet we have 
j.ust noted that if all is one, harmony and dis cord, good 
ani evil, must all be a part of th e One. How can these 
conce ptions 'ce harmonized? How can the moral and natural 
orders, so seemingly in contradiction, be harmonized? 
This harmony can be realized only upon two cond ition s, 
tha t the universe is interpreted as a purposive system, 
ar:d that the moral order r equires for its realization 
the freedom of individw.l persons. Morality is achieved 
through freedom, and the world to be a fit place for the 
operat ion of this freedo m and the realization of the "ideal 
of morality mus t 'ce following a purposive scheme. These 
two conditions, purpo s e and freedom, are not possible in 
a monistic and naturalistic system. Freedom must be re-
jected on the face of thi ngs, as inconsistent with the 
unity of the whole as one. To posit a principle of pur-
pose would be t o conceive of the world as conscious of the 
• 
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end sought. The world cannot be interpr e ted in terms 
of the result tow a r d vJhich it is striving , but viewed 
as it is, as a perfect Whole, as total reality. Purp ose 
involves two things , an idea of the end, and 
free activit y determi ned by the idea. I d eas be long to 
persons. Freedom belongs to perso n s. Surely her e if 
anywhere is the "vicious circle". If we do not interpret 
the world as purposive, the pr ob lEm of good anl evil is 
wi thout answer, and the moral order finds no plac e in 
.. 
reality. If we a dm it purpose, we attribute an idea rf 
purpose and ~ood to the world grou1n, thus recognizinr, 
mi nd as fundamental, worki ng toward an end. Our natural-
ism has become an ethical theism.1 
With personality , purpose and freedom gone, again 
we find the realization of the higher values impossible. 
This feeling of the inade quacy of the world for the 
realization of value has caused many to follo w a myst leal 
tendency which leads them eventually into pantheism. But 
even then the moral val ue is los t sight of, for all _is 
One, a:rrl all things howev·er good or bad, l e ad to the s ame 
goal, and in the end all is absorb ed into the Absolutet 
Individ ual immortality is impossible. With stricter 
naturalists, any c onception of immortality at all is out 
of the question , for all is matter, and all i s therefore 
subj := ct to the l aw s of me.tter, and therefore to disintegrat ion 
1. Sorle y , Moral Values and the Idea of God, Ch. XV 
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and decay. 
With the denial of con sci ousne ss is lost the 
idea of purposive prog ress and ere ativity. Biological 
adjustment is the only form of progre ss possible. When 
the behaviorist talks of pr cgre ss, he is out of the .realm 
of b ehavior and into the realm of ideas. Consciousness 
is the cause of events in the world. Biological adjust-
me nt has its place. But man is more than that. Since 
the advent of cons ciou sne ss (human) into the evolutionary 
series, the trend of evolution has b een, not toward en-
vironmen t , but awa.y from environment, not adaptation 
of the or gani sm to environment, but adjustment of the 
en vir onme nt to the organism. Crea tlon has 1::e en ani is a 
cooperative affair b et ween God ani man. Yet so ::>.e 
(Arne s and others) fearin g · a philosophic a l dualism, hold 
that nothing rew has co me into man's finer instincts 
but the refin ed characteristics ·of the animals. Conscious-
ness is something in the position of the old colored l ady 
whom Brooker T. Washing to n is said to have met on the 
street and greeted with, "Good morning Auntie, where are 
you going? 11 '~ , isn't gwine nowhars, Mistah Washington, 
Ah ' ·s already been whar Ah' s gwuine." 
There are t wo basic ·instincts to which man's 
higber traits may be traced , self-preservation (hunger) 
a..11.d pre serv ati on of the r ace (sex instinct) • On these 
• 
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hang the lavl and the prophets. The family instinct arose 
to control the sex instinct. The community developed 
to control this instinct. Still above this aro ~· e the 
1 
idea of the Fatherhood of God. Relig ion is simply of 
social value, and anythin g of social value is religious. 
Yet a re l igion that is valid only to the degree that 
it is soc 1allJI\useful is not objectiv ely valid. The ideals 
th a t lie at the basis of our r el ie;i on gather their power 
from their faith i n objective reality. 
The exponents of this view overlook the fact 
that a funct i on may be V"' ry unlike the source fr om which 
it evolved. They hold that the biological baclc ground 
may explain all the p resent. They wi ll analy ze every 
attitude and characteristic of man i nto biological 
elements. So we have prayer reduce d to a s y stem of neural 
atomism, and a book written on the psychDlo3Y of pra yer, 
upon this basis. 2 Yle shall then pray to a nervous 
system; since man is but a bundle of "annoyer s and 
satisfiers'', we shall take inventory of the satisfiers. 
We cannot pray to God, for he has beco me but an algebraic 
X, the symbol of b iological a djustment. 
With consciousness, purpose and freed om t ake n 
fro m our v ocabular y , behavior, adjustment and law inserted 
as primary, man b e c omes but a machine, rolling his way 
1. See-Ames, Psychology of Religious Expe rience. -
2. Ames, Psychology of Prayer. 
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with countle ss other machirn s, with no desires, no 
freedom, no self-direc t ion, and the sy mbol of h is religion 
become s a wheel, and his great example a Buddha. The 
Supre::IB Ruler is at best a n impersonal force. The in-
d ividual finds the direction of the current s , and confor ms, 
adjusts, and the 'Wheel turns. There is no room for Him, 
o ur examp le of perfect person ality, who saw the currents 
of thin g s as they are , but with self-direction and p urpo se, 
threw Himself across the current, am whose symbol beco mes 
a cross. 
C. I mplications of Sel f - Psy cholog,y. 
Self-p sychology has often been scorned as narr ow 
and dogmatic, and quite old f a shioned, thos e hurling the 
epi theta perhaps conf u sing it with the older c onception 
of soul psychology . But the e xp onents of this theory 
feel that they are able to show that far fro m being narrow, i t 
g ives one a far wider range of thou eht. We have seen 
tha t Associationism, if followed to its logical con clusion s, 
leads eventually to skepticism and solip sism, with God, 
immortality and the hi gher value s at b est onl ~r products 
of a fanciful imae i nation. Behaviorism leads us into a n 
extreme naturalism, fro m '\'fuich there is no escape. Miss 
Calk ins poin ts out the width and varie ty of thought 
p ossible while upholdi ng the pri ncip l e s o f self-psychology, 
-
• 
• 
- 92 -
when she says that (1) selves may be re garded from a 
dualistic p oin t of view as aform of reality coordi nate 
with rna. tter; (2) from pluralistic idealism, the inter-
related systems of selves may be treated as final 
reaJ.ity; (3) in Absolute Idealism, reality may be an 
Absolute Self and the individual selv e s related by virtue 
1 
of their manifestation of the Absolute. Self-psychology 
is most consistent vrl1h per sonalistic an:l theistic 
interpretation ~ although, as has been pointed out, it 
does not demand this. 
We have already noted its treatment of conscious-
ness, funct ion al and synoptic, rather than analytic. It 
makes the self a co n crete, consc iou s reality, at the sa:re 
time a unity ani a multiplicity. It reveals personality 
a s a time ani sp ace transcending c omplPx of self.:. c onscious 
experience, conn ected by rational principles. This is a 
most important problem in philosophy, to sh ow the s p iritual 
nature of con scious ness, f or only by so doing c an we have 
a con cep tion of a Rerso n al God. We n oted in the considera-
tion of behaviorism th at the solution of the pr oblem of 
go od and evil could be found only in the postulates of · 
purpose and free dom. The purely biological view permits 
n€ither. But when you pass from the merely b iolog ical 
l e vel to co ns cious b ~ ings, an i.dea of an end to be achieved 
becomes poosible. The end is not merely a result of lt:.he 
biological reaction s of the or ganism, but it is a ful-
fillment of a purpose present in the con sciousness of the 
1. Phil. Rev., 9 (1900), 492 
, . 
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subject. With the c .::mception of personality as capable 
of indefinite development, of indefinite incr ease in 
knowledge, creativity and service, of a world, not 
co ;-rp le te , but in a process of development or creation, 
it is clear that such a personality in such a world 
seeks, not only preservation, as an organism adjusting 
to an environment, but demands that this growth and 
developi!lent be mediated by an idea of value and purpose. 
Thi s conc3 pt1on of the self also d emands the postulation 
of individual freedom, i.e., that developing conscious-
ness is able, within limits, to choose for itself its 
ovm ends. With freedo m and purpose admitted, a basis 
is g iven fo r the solution of the problem of good and 
evil. Vlhen the quest ion is raised as to why the moral 
and the natural orders seem so in conflict, and moral 
values so inadequately realised, the answer may found 
in the fact that moral valU3s are realized in free persons 
only; that freedom is necessarJr for goodness; that the 
val ues of wh ich man is capable r equi re s freedom of 
choice. With freedom of tbe individual and purpose of 
the universe, we may regard the world of nature as a fit 
nedium f or the development o f mor al b e ings. 
·We find in the self-psychologist's conception 
of personality the only satisfactory account of values. 
Intrinsic values can be long to persons only, value is a 
• 
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persona 1 experience, is dependent ori pe r sonality. 
Sorley, (and others ) have shown the ob j e ctivi ty of 
valU3, tha t value is a r eal i.ty be yond the sub ject or 
1 individual cons ciousre s s. The s e seem to be c o n-
t radictory pro p ositions. But if the self- psycholog ist's 
c o nce ption of p erso n elity is correct, we may be justified 
i n believ i ng that "true val :..;.es are e xperiences of a 
mind beyond all human individuals and s ocieties. Since 
true value s are a coherent sy stern , i t is more rea sonable 
to s uppose that the mind i s one and not many. Here a gain 
we see that thought driv e s us in the direction of the 
hypothesis of a supreme mi nd or p erson as the ultima te 
reality of t he univer s e and the home of va.lue 11 • 2 
It 1s mt the intention in this paper to giv e the 
ar guments for the exi stence of God, whether one argue 
from desig n or i d ea, from the ep istemolog ic a l or t he 
c osmolog ica l, or from the mor ·al point s of vie v7, but simp l y 
t o sh ow that the ba sis g i v en b y the sell-psychologist is 
the only one that gives log ical ground s for believing 
t his God to be personal, tra nscendent a11d immanent, God 
e xist ent f or Himself and not exhausted by His relation 
t o nature and to us, God present in and the c ause of 
nature and human personality. The belief i n such a Go d 
is the only hypothesis that will interpret all the .f a cts 
1. Sorle y, Mor al Valu e s ani __ th~Idea of Q:od. 
2. Bri €')1 t man, Intr_S2_ducti on to_~.b.-~ losoP._gy, 163-164 
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of experience. One's relig ion depends on one's conception 
of Gcxl. The life o f devotion, prayer and worship de-
pends on a fellowship or communion with a p ersonal 
God. Miss Calkins, in her Good Man and the Good, bring s 
out ~~e fact th at religion everywhere, whatever its form, 
personalizes the object o objects of its Yrorship, that 
the most primitive peoples workship their fetishes only 
as they regard them a :: symbols of some form of spirit or . 
personality. Worahip implie s a person to be worshipped 
and a per son to worship, in ot her words, only p e rsons can 
wor ship an:l be worshipped. True prayer, tr ue communion 
with God, i 's only possible wh en the subject, a person, 
p r ays to a Q~r§_onal God. 
A recognition of personality and its preservation 
gives us basis for b eli e f in immortality. Man's JQ.oral 
an:l religious experience, . an:l the whole realm of values, 
includes te lief in p er sonal immorta lity. Our moral 
nature d emand s the deve lopment of value. We have seen 
that value depends on personality. If this is true, no 
bit of personality can be lost without decreasing the 
potentiality of v alU3 in the universe. 
Though finite personality is imperfe ct and 
dependent, it reveals g limpses of what a complete person 
would be. In moments of most adequate experience man 
has revealed to him an Ideal Personality. However 
fragmentary, persJnality is the highest, most unified, 
the most rational and comp let e thing that we know. While 
' 
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our fini t e personality is ne ver complete or perfect, 
full e r pe rsonalit y is always p ossi ble, becaus e o f t he 
creat ive na ture of con sc i ousness. To be · a fuller and a 
more co mple t e per s on alit y , and to make the world a 
tetter plB~ ce f or the development of person ality, is a 
cha llenge t o oyalty and service har dly to be equalled 
by a theory Which limits consciou sness to a "bundle of 
perceptions" or to biolog i ca l reacti ons to environr~ent. 
Briefly we may summarize t he impor t ant p oint s 
in the sig nificance o f the recognition of c onsci ousness, 
t he total stream of experience, for our r e ligious thinking . 
Pers on alitv is essential for the s 0l ut ion of the problem , .; 
of good and evil. Tr ue worship i mpli e s p e rs onalit y . 
The socia l nature o f man implie s a s o cial r e la t i on t oward 
othe r pe rsons, human a nd cl iv ine. The interpenetrati on 
of value s dep ends upon the unifying princip le o f p er-
son ali ty. Intrinsic values can be r e c:.lized only in pe r -
s onality. The moral nature of man implies p ersonality . 
Relig ion, as the conservation of value , i mplies the preser-
vation of person ality, hence individual immortality. A 
cle ar v iev.r o f pe rson a lity must underlie a faith i n God. 
Relie i on cannot be fully defined apart from the c onception 
or pe rson ality, if a normative definition is rat i onal -
reli g i on is an attitude of li f e characterized by a faith 
in and a feeline; of dep endence on Goo, and dominated by 
a will t o cooperate wi th God in the con serva tion and in-
crease o f value. Religi on cannot be j ud ged true or false 
• 
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·without con s 1d ering the reasonable ness of p ersonali t y 
a s a principle of explana tion of the world ground • 
SU!!.1MARY 
The problem of consciousness, of soul, or self, 
is one of the oldest and mos t vital questions in the 
history of man's thinkin g . We have traced briefly the 
various con centions of the self through ancient Greek, 
Buddhist and Indian Philosophy, through Scholasticism, 
through continental Rationalism and English Empiricism, 
e ndeavor ing to s.."low the orig ins of modern prevailing 
theories. 
Our next problem was a discussion of methods 
of ap p roa ch to the study of p.sycholog;y . We saw that 
Struc turalism, while scientific, is nevertheless abstract 
and incomplete, limiting the study of consc i ou sness to 
the a nalysis of mental content . Functionalism also 
disregard s the self and there fore is only partie. l in its 
scope, with danger from too much emphasis· on the physio-
logic al aspects of the problem. The Gestalt Psycholo3ie 
has the advantae;e of trea.ting experi ence as a whole, 
recognizes consdousr.ess, and is a swinging away from tra-
ditional atomistic conceptions. 
We then at temp ted a brief exp os it ion of three 
outstanding theories of consciousness, Associationism, 
Behe.v iorism and Self-P sych ology. As so cia tionism would 
account for all the facts of conscious 11 fe, except sensa-
tion, as P1"od u cts of associa ti onal processes. Its 
• 
problem is to analyze ment a l proc e sses into elementary 
experiences and then to synth esize by laws of association, 
a psycho-physical process. Behaviorism would limit 
Psycholog y to the study of biolog ical reactions to en-
viromne n t . Its goal is to ascerta:u1 such data regarding 
s ti mull a nd reactions, that g iven the one the nat ure of 
t he other may be predi c ted or specified. It is an out-
gr ow th o f r adical Fun :-.: tionalism. 
Self-Psychology regards psycholog y as the "science 
of conscious selve s". It believes this position to be 
thor ou@1ly scientif i c and at the same time concrete, for 
more than analytic, it vlews c onsciousness a s the whole 
of exp erience a nd in rele.tion to environmen t. 
Our fina l problem was to determine what effe ct 
tr19 se theories would log ic ally h ave upon our reli g ious 
tltlinking . We found that Ass ociationisn led us into 
skepticism and ul tirnB. tely into solipsism. 
Behavioris m we f ound allied with Na t uralism, 
Matel~ialism ani Mechanism, a system leaving no room for 
God, immortality, or ths higher values. 
Sel f -Psycholog y g ives us t h e widest range for 
o v:r thinking , being co n sis tent with a dualistic point of 
vie w, with Pluralist lc or Ab solute I<iealism, and esneciall v 
~ ., 
relat ed to Personalistic and Theistic interpretations of 
the worlo. ground. 
• 
• 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
( English) 
Abbott, E. S., "The Dynamic Value of Content", !l,.Q.ur.! _  Phil.!..., 
14 (1917), 41-47. 
Ames, E. S., "Theology fro m the St andpoi nt of Function al 
Psychology~", Am. Jour. Theol., 10 (1910), 219-232. 
~~es, E. s ., ~~ychology of Religious Experien~~' Bos t on: 
Hou @1 ton , Mifflin , 1910. 
Ange l l, J. R., "Relation s of Stru ctural and Functional Psy-
cholog y to Philosophy. 11 , Phil. Rev. , 12 ( 1903) , 243-272. 
Ange l l, J. R., "Behavior as a Cate gory of Psychology.", 
Psych. Rev., 20 (1913), 255-270 
Ane.e 11, J . R., "The Provi nee of Functional Psycholog y"., 
Psych!.. __ Rev., 14 (1907), 61-91 
Ang e l l, J. R., Psycholog y, N.Y.: Holt, 1904 
Bode, B. H.( "The Nature of the Psychical.", Jour. Phil., 
14 (1917), 288-294 
Ba::le, B. H., "Psychology as a Science of Behavior.", Psych. 
Rev., 21 (1914), 46-61. 
Bod e , B. H., "Consciou srnss or Behavior,", Jour. Phil., 
1 5 (1918)' 449~453. 
Bode, B. H., "The Method of Introspection .", Jou~ Phil., 
10 (1913)' 85-91 
Brett, G. S ., A Histo£I_21_Psy9Qp1~gy, London: Geo. Allen 
& Co., 1912. 
Bri gh t man, E. S., An I n troduction to Philosopgy, New York: 
Holt, 1925 
Buckham , J. W., Personality and Psycholo~, N.Y.: Doran, l924. 
Buckham , J. W., Person ality a nd the Christian I deal, Boston: 
Pilgrim Press, 190 9 
Calkins, M. W., "Psychology as the Science of Self.", Jour. 
Phil. , 5 (1908), 112-120. 
Calk ins, M. W., ttPsycholo e:y , vVhat is it about?", Jo_u r. Phil., 
4 {1907), 673-685. 
• 
• 
Calkin s, M. W., "The Self in Scientific Psychology. 11 , 
Am. Jour. Psv ch., 26 ( 1915), 495-524. 
Calki ns, M. W., "Elements of Co n scious Complexes.", ~.§_ych . 
Rev • , 7 ( 190 0 ) , 37 7-3 8 8 
Calki n s, M. w., A Fie st Book _.l:B_~§ycho~Qg,y_. 4 ed. , N. Y.: 
Macmillan, 1914 
Cal~c in s, M. W., "Psychology as the Science of Selves. 11 , Phil.!.. 
Rev. ,_ 9 ( 1900 ) , 490 -501. 
Carr, H., "The Natm·e of Mental Process.", Psych. Rev., 24 
(1917), 181-187 
Carus ,Paul, The Gospel of_Budd ha.z.._Accordlng to Old Records, · 
3 ed., Chicago: Open ·court Pub. Co., 1895. 
Coe, G. A. "A Propo s ed Cle.s s ification o f Mental Functi on s. 11 
Psych. Rev., 22 (1915), 87-98. 
Creight on , J. E., "The Standpoin t of Psychology.", Phil. Rev., 
23 (1914)' 159-175. 
Davids, Mrs . Rhys, Buddhism, N. Y.: Holt, 1912 
Davids, Mr s. Rhys, Bud~hist~cholo&r, Lo nd on : G. Bel l , 1914 
Dcd ge, R., 11 The Theory and Limita tions of Introspe ct1on. 11 , 
Am. Jour. Psy ch., 2; (1912 ), 214-229. 
Edgell , B., Theories of Memory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 192lt. 
Erwin, Walle. ce , Outlines of the ~.g.uQ..§.o nhx__?.f A~ .. is _!..otl~, 3 ed. 
Cambrid ge: Uni ver sity Pre ss, loo3. 
Frost, E. P., "Cannot Psy ch ology Dispense with Consciou sness? .. , 
Psv ch. Rev., 21 ( 1914), 204-211 _ 
~-----
Frost, E. P., "The Belief in Consciousne ss:', Jour. Pl.J.J:.l ., 
10 (1913 ), 716-719 
Frost, E. P., "Can Biology a nd Physiology Dispens e with 
Consci ou ern ss? 11 , E.§.Ych. Rev. , 19 ( 1912) , 2 46-252 
Gallow ay, G., ,!he PhiJ:.oson'Q.y of Relip:,ion, N. Y.: Scribners, 1914 
Galloway, G., .f:.rinci p les of Re11p;t_ous Develonment, N. Y.: 
Macmillan, 190 9 
Ga1lo·.·r~lV, G., "The Problem of the Person ality of God.", Jour . of 
Re1., 1 (1921), 296-306 
• 
• 
Hayden, A. E., "The olo8ical Trend of Pragmatism.", 
Am. Jour. Phil., 23 (1919), 401 -
Herrick, C. J., "Intro~pe cti on as a Biolog ical Me thod.", 
Jour. Phil., 12 (1915), 5'~3-551 
Hocking, W. E., The Me ani~ of __ Gcxl.~D.___H_l!!Jlan Experience, 
New Haven: Yale Press, 1912. 
Hopkins, E. W., History of Religion, Buddhi~1, pp 183-204 
N.Y. : Macmillan, 19l.l 
Hume, David, A Treatise of Human_ Nature (Everyman's Library 
Ed . ) , N . Y. : Dut ton , 1911 
Hume, David, Philosophical Works ~f David Hume, Vol. II, 
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1854. 
HuYJ.ey, Thomas, Hume, London: Macmillan, 1909 
Jam:: s, Wm., Psycholo~L. Briefer Course, N.Y.: Henry Holt, 1892 
Kantor, J. R., Prlncinles of Psych.Q.:l...2..&.L N.Y.: Knopf, 1924 
Klrkpatri.ck, E. A., "A Broader B sis for Psychology Necessary." 
![ou:r:~hiJ:.., 4 ( 1907), 542-546. . 
Klemm, Otto, A History of Psychology, (trans. by E. C. Wilmand 
and R. Pitner), N.Y.: Scribners, 1914 
Knudson, A. C., Present Tendenc i:~_.e_in Reliv.J. 9u s TQ.ougp t, 
N. Y. : Tbe Abingdon Press, 192 4. 
Koffka, K., "Perception: An Intra::iuction to the Gestalt Theory." 
Psych. Bulletin, 19 (1922), 531-585 
Lair d , J., ProQ.~em of the _..§.§ .. :J:f, Lord on: Macmillan, 1917. 
Laird, J., "Introspection.", f!ind., 28 ( 1919), 385-406. 
Marshall, H. R., "Behavior.", Jour. Phil., 15 (1918), 258-266 
Marshall, H. R., "Psychic Function am Psychic Structure.", 
Mind, 23 (1914), 180-193 
McDougall, w., Outlines 'J f Psy_gh_olog_;y, N. Y: Scribners, 1923 
McDougall, W., Social Psycholog[, Boston: Luce, 1921 
Menzies, A., History Religions, Buddhism, pp 353-3580., 
N.Y.: Scribners, 1903. 
• 
• 
Merrington, E. N., The Problem of Personality, London: 
Macmillan, 1916. 
Meyer, M. F., The Fun<?.amental Laws of Human Behavior -, 
Boston: Badger, 1911 
Montgomery, J. A., Relip; ions of :t.l:l..§_ F~~-_Bast 1_ . Edgerton, 
"Brahmanism and Hinduism.", pp lDl-182, Philadelphia-
London : Lippencotts, 1918. 
Moore, J. s., The Foundatio ns of Psychology, Princeton: 
Universi t y Press, 1921 
Munsterburg, H., P§J:cholo ~-' :Y: J....._Q:_~_neral_a¢ Applied, N. Y.: 
Appletons, 1914. 
Muscio, B., "Psycholog y as Behaviorism.", Monist, 31 (1921), 
182-202. 
Pepner, S. c., "What is Introspe ction?", Am. Jour. Philu 
- 29 ( 1918) , 208-213 
Pratt, J. B., The RAligious Q.Q_nsc t..?.Jl Sness 2 N.Y.: 
Macmillan, 1920 
Robinson -Robinson, E. S., & F. H., Readin g s in~chology, 
Chicago: University Press, 1923 . 
P.eischauer, A. C. , Studi e s i n Japanese Buddhism, N. Y. : 
Macmillan, 1917. 
Richard, Timothy, The New Testament of H1r;her Buddhism, 
Edinburgh: Clark, 1910. 
Rotack, A. A., Behaviorism and~cholorr y, Cambrid ge: University 
Bookstore, 1923. 
Rog ers, A. K., !_Student~1sto~y_of Philosophy, N. Y.: 
Mac:millan, 1923. 
Ro gers, A. K., '!3ome Recent Theories of Consciousness.", 
Mi nd , 29 (1920), 294-312. 
Royce , J., Outlines of Psychology , N. Y.: Macmillan, 1903 
Saurders, K. J., Bud dhism i n the ~o:iern World, London : Society 
f or Promoting Christian Knowl ed c e, 1922. 
Seth, A. Pringle-Patt ison, Tg~Idea of Gcxi in the Li sht of 
Recent Philosongy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917. 
• 
• 
Singer, E. A., Mind As Behavior, Columbus: Adams, 1924. 
Sor ley, w. R., Moral Value.§.___§!ld the Idea of God, N. Y.: 
Macmillan, 1921 
Stric k~nd, F. L., Psyc~olo -:-w of Relicl ous Exoerie nee, 
N. Y : Abingdon , 192 • . 
Tawny, G. A., 11 iiJhat is Behaviorism?", Jour. Phil., 12 (1915), 29-32 
Thilly, F., "The Self.", Phil. Rev., 19 (1910), 22-33 
Thilly, F., A History of Philoso~hy, N. Y.: Holt, 1922. 
Tl tcllener, E. B . ., "Structural a nd Functional Psychology . 11 , 
Eh~Rev., B (1899 ), 290-299 · . 
Titchener, E. B., 11·The Schema of I n trospe ction." Am.Joq_r.Psych., 
23 (1912)' 485-508. 
Titchener, E. B., "A Note of Conscious Self. 11 , Am. Jour. Psych., 
22 (1911), 540-552. 
Tit ch e ner, E. B., "The Postul ates of a Struct ural Psychology.", 
Phil. Rev., 7 (1898), 449-465 
Titche rn r, E. B., A Textbook of Psycholog y, N. Y.: Macmillan, 1910. 
Alabaster, H., The Wheel of the Law, London : Trfibner, 1871. 
Un:ierwo od, H. G .• , i!elig ions of Eastern Asia, Buddhi sm , 
pp 183-230 , N. Y.: Macmillan, 1910. 
Wan~ en, H. C. , ffuma_n Psvcho1ogy, Boston: Houghton , Mifflin, 1919 
Warr en, H. C., History o f Association P sych olQgy, N.Y.: 
Scribners, 1921 
Wat son, J ohn, ,Interpreta tion of Re}ip; ious Experience, Glasgow: 
MacLehos e, 1912. 
Watson, J. B., ~.§_ycholog y f ro m the St~nd-g oint of a Behavioris t , 
N. Y.: Lipp incott, 1919. 
Wat s on , J. B., "An Attemp t ed Formula t io n of the Scope o f Be-
havior Psycholog y.", Psych. Re~:...' 24 (1917), 32 9-352. 
Webb, C. C. J., Divine Person ality and Huma n Life, London: 
Allen & Unwin , 1920. 
• 
• 
Weber, A., History of Philosophy, N. Y.: Scr i bner s , 1896 
Weiss, A. R., "Relation between Functional and Behavior 
Ps ycholo3 y.", !:~h. Rev., 24 (1917), 353-368 
Weiss, A. R., "Relation between Structural and Behavior 
Psycholog y.", !:~h. Rev., 24 1917), 301-317 
Weiss, A. R., "Conscious Behavior.", Jour. Phil., 15 (1918), 
631-641. . 
Yerkes, R. M., "The Study of Human Beha vior.", Science, 
39 (1914), 625-632. 
Yerkes, R. H., "Psychology in Relc. tion to Biology.", Jour. 
Phil., 7 (1910), 113-124 . 
